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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation investigates the historical development of the right-to-
know concept in the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act 
(EPCRA) of 1986. It starts with the use of words during the American Revolution, 
words capacious or general enough to later include the modern right-to-know 
idea.  It also traces the real emergence of the right-to-know concept during the 
Cold War years of the 1950s and 1960s, including the enactment of the Freedom 
of Information Act (FOIA) in 1966.  Some of the limitations of the FOIA are 
discussed here, limited as it was and is by nine broad ―exemptions‖ to the 
release of information by the federal Executive Branch.  This study deals with an 
important legislative response to environmental disasters and near-disasters, 
with the aid of the Anti-Toxic and Environmental Justice movements of the late 
20th century and  ending with the enactment of EPCRA in 1986 and its effects in 
subsequent decades. This historical account also provides a brief analysis on 
how the legislation based on the right-to-know principle opened opportunities for 
the field of communication, especially environmental risk communication. EPCRA 
was the first federal law in the United States to fully embrace the right-to-know 
approach to public policy, also known as regulation through revelation. The right-
to-know approach is based on the ideas of self-governance and public 
participation in the decision-making process. EPCRA has served as a model for 
more than 80 countries, which adopted laws based on the right-to-know principle 
in different levels since EPCRA‘s enactment.  
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INTRODUCTION 
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society but 
the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened 
enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the 
remedy is not to take it from them, but to inform their discretion. 
Thomas Jefferson1 
 
 ―For knowledge itself is a power,‖ Sir Francis Bacon wrote in 1597 in his 
Meditationes Sacrae.2 In an open democratic state, power comes from the 
people and therefore people should have the necessary knowledge to partake in 
the decision-making process of their own government. In the United States of 
America, seen sometimes as an example of democracy for the rest of the world, 
the political system is actually ―a republic,‖ as Benjamin Franklin asserted after 
the Constitutional Convention on September 18, 1787, adding, ―if you can keep 
it.‖   
The word republic comes from the Latin Res Publica, meaning ―public 
thing/affair‖ or ―belonging to the public.‖ The concept of a republic, like the 
concepts of democracy and open government, implies that the government has a 
mandate to represent the interests of the true power-holders, the people. That 
system differs greatly from the earlier monarchic systems, where kings and 
queens claimed a right, even divine right, to rule over the people. This 
differentiation was in the core of the American Revolution and can be said to be 
the spirit of the Declaration of Independence, as can be seen in its second 
                                                 
1
 Ep igraph: Thomas Jefferson, letter to Williams Charles Jarv is, September 28, 1820.  
2
 Francis Bacon. Meditations Sacrae and Human Philosophy (Kessinger Publishing, 1996; original work 
published in1597), 71.  
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paragraph: ―That to secure these Rights, Governments are instituted among 
men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.‖3 The 
Founding Fathers of the republic wanted, above all, independence, both 
economic and political.4 
Many of them believed that a well-informed public makes for better 
decision making than an elite of chosen patricians or nobles. That idea, born in 
the ideological war against King George III of England during the American 
Revolution, resurged during the later part of the 20th century as the core of a new 
perspective (and some say new paradigm) in public policy.5 The right-to-know 
approach to public policy—also known as regulation through revelation—is 
based on the ideas of self-governance and public participation in the decision-
making process 6 and was finally made into a federal law in the Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-know Act (EPCRA) of 1986. 7 
This dissertation investigates the historical development of the right-to-
know concept in EPCRA, starting in the American Revolution, passing through 
the Anti-toxic and Environmental Justice Movements from the second half of the 
                                                 
3
 The Declaration of Independence of the United States of America , § 2. See Appendix.  
4
 Uhm, Kiul. 2008. “The Founders and the Revolutionary Underpinning of the Concept of the Right to 
Know.” J&MC Quarterly 85, no. 2: 393-416. 
5
 Karkkainen, Bradley C. 2000. “Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance 
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm,” Georgetown Law Journal 89: 257-370; K.M. Shrivastava's 
book, The Right to Information: A Global Perspective (New York: Lancer, 2009), refers to more than 80 
countries have adopted laws using the right to know princip le.  
6
 James T. Hamilton. Regulation through revelation: The origins, politics, and impacts of the Toxic Release 
Inventory Program. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Robert V. Percival, Christopher H. 
Schroeder, Allan S. Miller, and James P. Leape. Environmental Regulation: Law, science, and policy. 5th 
ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers , 2006);  Ann Florini. ed. The right to know: transparency for an open 
world. (New York: Columbia University Press , 2007). 
7
 EPCRA, 1986. 42 U.S.C. 11001 et seq., partially codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). EPCRA was 
initially written as Title III of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986, but it 
was enacted as a free-standing law. 
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20th century and ending with the effects of EPCRA in the late 20 th century early 
21st century, analytically observing how the legislation based on the right-to-know 
principle opened opportunities for the field of communication, especially 
environmental risk communication.8 
In the last decades of the 20th century, authors including Anthony Giddens 
and Ulrich Beck started to see how the rapidly growing complexity of modern 
social organizations made it virtually impossible for any governmental insti tution 
to deal with social problems relying solely on governmental apparatuses.9 At the 
same time, more and more authors in the social sciences and humanities have 
pointed out the failure of exclusively market-based policies in providing just and 
desirable conditions to society as a whole. The context in which the 21st century 
society begun became known as what Beck called ―the risk society.‖10 
In the United States, realizations about the failure of governmental 
institutions, both ―command-and-control,‖ where the government set and 
enforced the rules through penalties, and ―market-based,‖ where government 
                                                 
8
 Marc D. Shapiro found strong scientific support that, among the causes for environmental injustices in 
issues involving toxic chemicals, “changes in emission patterns are affected by a community‟s ability to 
process complex information and its capacity for collective act ion.” Also, Rebecca S. Weeks found that the 
most effective communities in preparing  fo r toxic emergencies were making use of creative 
communicat ions approaches to EPCRA, including the Internet, phone books, calendars, mouse pads, 
grocery bags, refrigerator magnets, brochures, newspaper articles, v ideos for the local government 
channels, and even utility bills inserts to identify elderly membe rs who might need special help. Weeks also 
found that community members will only act proactively towards emergency planning after receiving 
messages relating to emergency planning  almost two dozen t imes. Shapiro, Marc. D. “Equity and 
Information: Information Regulation, Environmental Justice, and Risks from Toxic Chemicals.” Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, 24, no. 2 (2005): 373-398; Weeks, Rebecca S. “The Bumpy Road to 
Community Preparedness: The Emergency Planning and Community Right -to-know Act.” Environmental 
Law 4, no. 827 (1997-1998): 827-889. 
9
 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-identity. (Palo A lto; Chicago: Stanford University Press, 1991).  
Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity (London: Sage Publications, 1992; original work 
published in Germany in 1986).  
10
 More on the contextualization of the risk society is provided in chapter III. 
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offers incentives like tax reductions for compliance, policies gave birth to a series 
of social movements. Among them, two became especially significant in 
promoting new ways to deal with the complexities of the new state of public 
affairs: the Anti-toxic Movement, later transformed into the Environmental Health 
Movement, and the Environmental Justice Movement.11 By the end of the 1970s, 
entire communities were living in and suffering from the aftermath of 
environmental disasters (toxic spills from factories, placement of hazardous 
materials waste sites closer to ethnic and poor communities, double standards 
for sanitation of richer and poorer communities, etc .). These communities started 
to fight back, using information and community organization as their weapons of 
choice. Far from isolated situations, these problems were widespread12 and 
became part not only of mainstream news media reports, but also part of the 
cultural identity of the late 20th century through a series of prize-winning, 
bestseller books and blockbuster movies.13  
Love Canal became one of the most cited toxic-chemical-related incidents 
both in the academic and non-academic literature, but it was small compared to 
the thousands of accidents and criminal acts involving dumping and spilling of 
hazardous and toxic materials that followed in the years after the Love Canal 
                                                 
11
 The capitalization of the movements‟ names follow the majority of studies used in this dissertation. 
12
 More than 7,000 accidents involving spills of toxic and hazardous materials were registered between 
1980 and 1985 in the U.S. Falkenberry, E. M. 1995. “The Emergency planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act: A tool for toxic release reduction in the 90‟s.” Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 3, no. 1: 1-
36. 
13
 Erin Brockovich, a blockbuster movie written by Susannah Grant, directed by Steven Soderbergh and 
with Ju lia Roberts in an Oscar-winning role, won 26 awards and was nominated for another 42. Jonathan 
Harr‟s book A Civil Action is still acclaimed as one of the most influential non-fict ion bestsellers and was 
followed by a movie version of the same name with John Travolta in the lead ro le. Both stories were based 
on real cases of towns that were contaminated by toxic spills from nearby plan ts. 
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incident.14  All the attention from the media and popular outrage resulted in laws 
like the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), commonly known as Superfund. Even so, it was an international 
incident in Bhopal, India that caught the attention of a few members of the 
American Congress to another aspect of those tragedies: the absolute incapacity 
of the government to deal with the matter by itself.  
An accident in a U.S.-owned Union Carbide‘s pesticide plant in 1984 
caused the release of a cloud of the lethal gas methyl isocyanate (MIC) into the 
air over Bhopal, a city located in the state of Madhya Pradesh in central India. 
Amnesty International counted 7,000 deaths immediately after the release and 
another 15,000 due to associated illnesses in the following years. In 2004, 
Amnesty International asserted that more than 100,000 people still suffered from 
diseases associated with the toxic gases and many more fell ill from breathing 
them. Although Union Carbide Corporation sti ll denied any responsibility for the 
disaster,15 more than a 145 law suits16 followed the disaster in the American 
courts. In 1985, an accident in another Union Carbide plant involving a less lethal 
gas than MIC caused the 135 people to be hospitalized in Institute, West Virginia, 
after the plant passed two safety examinations.    
                                                 
14
 See footnote 12. 
15
 “A Bitter Wind in Bhopal.,” 2004. Amnesty International, 
http://web.amnesty.org/wire/December2004/Bhopal (accessed June 28, 2007). The numbers of deaths 
directly related to the incident varies from source to source. Amnesty International‟s numbers are on the 
high average. Other reports vary from 2,000 immediate deaths to 10,000 and from 60,000 to 150,000 
associated illnesses. 
16
 Most of the lawsuits were settled, some were  still wait ing for a decision in November, 2008.  
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Finally understanding the impossibility of a sufficiently rapid response to 
such disasters and fearing a large-scale catastrophe on American soil, federal 
policymakers proposed a new law based on the right-to-know idea. The objective 
was to approach the problem with a preventive mindset or, at least, provide a 
much faster locally-based response. In 1986, Congress enacted EPCRA, a 
legislative rarity17 in the United States,18 which has become a precursor and 
model for many similar openness policies in more than 80 other nations.19 
This study traces briefly the origins of the ideological concept of the 
public‘s right to know in the writings of Thomas Paine, George Mason, James 
Madison, and Thomas Jefferson as a fundamental part of the new republican 
system of 1787. It will then follow the developments of the right-to-know concept 
in the 20th century with the birth of the Anti-toxic Movement that had the right to 
know about the existence and effects of toxic materials in the environment and in 
communities as one of its main claims. After this background, this study looks 
into how the idea of the public‘s right to know evolved into a new public policy 
approach with the enactment of EPCRA. Lastly, as the community-right-to-know 
                                                 
17
 EPCRA was the first law to use the right-to-know approach to public policy in the country, instead of a 
“command-and-control” or a “market-based” approach. 
18
 Uhm, “The Founders.” Uhm‟s argument that the right to know should be a constitutional right, although 
historically accurate in its presentation, still is more of an academic discussion and has no official 
constitutional standing. As Uhm admits, the Supreme Court of the United States has found a First 
Amendment right of access to government information only in the setting of coverage o f criminal trials. 
See also Dwight L. Teeter, Jr. and Bill Loving, Law of Mass Communications, 12th ed.  (New York: 
Thomson Reuters/Foundation Press), 492, citing Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 100 
S.Ct. 2814 (1980). According to both Uhm and to Teeter and Loving, the Supreme Court‟s understanding 
of the topic can be summarized by Justice Potter Stewart‟s speech about the Pentagon Papers at Yale in 
1974 as the justice said that the press is free to fight secrecy, but has no constitutional guarantee that it will 
succeed.  
19
 Kshitindra Mohan Shrivastava. The Right to Information: A Global Perspective. (New Delhi: Lancer 
Publishers, 2009). 
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idea at the core of EPCRA created communication opportunities for different 
groups in society, this dissertation provides a critical discussion on how these 
opportunities came to be and what they mean for the practice and research of 
communication.  
Content organization 
This dissertation consists of a mix of historical narrative, historiographic 
analysis, and critical investigations of academic literature and of relevant 
government records and other primary sources.20 It explores the historical 
contexts in which the right-to-know concept was created, developed, and 
transformed into what it is today in EPCRA, what it means for society, and its 
impacts on the study of communication and public policy in environmental issues. 
With those objectives in mind, Chapter 1 defines the methodological approach 
used in this dissertation and provides a road map of the analytical tools used to 
write the history of EPCRA and discuss its importance in today‘s society. 
Chapter 2 presents an historiographic analysis21 of the origins of the 
ideological concept of right to know as an instrumental principle of open 
governments as presented in the writings of a few Founding Fathers of the 
United States, especially Thomas Jefferson. It then jumps to the resurgence of 
the debate on the right to know in the 1950s as consequence of the end of World 
War II. The narrative culminates with the enactment of EPCRA in 1986. 
                                                 
20
 A complete description of the methodology and use of primary and secondary sources can be found in 
the next chapter. Also, see Appendix fo r a list of primary sources. 
21
 In Chapter 2, a mix of p rimary sources and secondary sources was used to verify the origins of the 
writings, as exp lained in Chapter 1.  
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Chapter 3 tells the story of the resurgence of the right-to-know concept 
through an analysis of the academic literature on the development of the Anti-
toxic Movement and, later, the Environmental Justice Movement. Starting from 
an analytical framework based on a description of the late 20 th century society by 
Ulrich Beck, the chapter provides justification and context for the development of 
the movement. It also introduces the theoretical and pragmatic tools used by the 
movements, and used by researchers to study the movements‘ activities, as 
related to the field of communication.   
The first part of the chapter refers to the developments and consequences 
of what Beck called the ―risk society‖ and its contextualization as a ferti le ground 
for community organization, risk management, and self-governance as they are 
directly related to the right-to-know principle and the idea of toxic risks. The 
second part of the Chapter 3 presents a narrative of the development of the 
social movements that guided the resurgence of the right to know, starting in the 
Conservation Movement of the late 1800s and early 1900s, passing through the 
Civil Rights and Environmental movements of the 1960s and 1970s, but mainly 
focusing on the movements of the 1970s, like the Anti-toxic Movement, and their 
evolution into the beginning of the 21st century. The third part of Chapter 3 
defines the communication tools that have been mainly used by those 
movements and as a reaction to them: environmental and risk communication. 
Chapter 4 presents EPCRA‘s history. In this chapter, the discussions and 
struggles within society and Congress—especially the role of James J. Florio, 
main author of both CERCLA and SARA/EPCRA—about the conceptualization of 
 14 
the law are presented in historical narrative  based on official records, newspaper 
stories, and a variety of other historical documents and secondary sources. The 
main objective is to expose the nuances, assumptions, understandings, and 
turbulences involved in the enactment of the legislation and its right-to-know 
approach. The chapter goes on to show the reactions to and developments of 
EPCRA as the ripples of its enactment changed the way certain groups relate to 
public policy and general behavior about toxic waste issues in society.  
Lastly, through a critical summary of the previous chapters, Chapter 5 
presents a discussion on how the right to know has become more and more 
accepted as an approach to public policy. It focuses on how the right to know 
affects the study of communication, putting the field in the forefront of public life. 
As the famous British sociologist Anthony Giddens wrote, ―such information or 
knowledge is not incidental to modern institutions, but constitutive of them.‖22 
Likewise, EPCRA forced the compilation and distribution of information about 
release and storage of toxic chemicals, which became constitutive of the 
organizations, public and private, that dealt with it.  
 
                                                 
22
 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self-identity, 20. 
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CHAPTER 1: MATERIALS AND METHODS 
History and Historiography 
The will is free, but who can account for his own acts and opinions 
without invoking influences and accidents? Would I have devoted 
my life to reading and teaching history, would I feel so keenly the 
passion of an era – five hundred years of high creation going down 
in confusion; would I, instead of repining, cultivate and recommend 
a spirited pessimism if I had not had, at a particular time and place, 
a vivid sight of an earlier world, soon followed by its collapse in 
wretchedness and folly? 
Jacques Barzun23 
 
As Calvin once said in Bill Waterson's iconic comic strip Calvin and 
Hobbes, ―History is the fiction we invent to persuade ourselves that events are 
knowable and that life has order and direction.‖ In a way, Waterson revealed 
some of the most intrinsic problems of History as a methodological approach to 
research. Historical events cannot be captured in any other way but through 
partial or trace evidence, including surviving documents and public and personal 
accounts, although circumstantial evidence can point us in certain directions. 
Details, intentions, and emotions are filtered through the perceptions of 
witnesses and/or first-person accounts (i.e. letters, journals, newspapers, official 
records, etc.) that might be misleading, either purposely or accidentally. The 
context, if misinterpreted, can lead to false assumptions and inaccurate 
conclusions. 
                                                 
23
 Jacques Barzun. “Toward a Fateful Seren ity,” in A Jacques Barzun Reader: Selections from His Works, 
ed. Michael Murray (New York: Perennial Classics, 2002), 3. 
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The historical narrative provides a first impression about specific events, 
but it also fi lls the blanks left by the lack of surviving evidence with interpretations 
from archaeologists, historians and other scholars. But such accounts can also 
be contaminated with ontological and axiological understandings that do not fit 
ones that existed at the moment of the event. Even the very perception of time as 
a linear phenomenon is accepted almost only by modern Western civilization.24 
Joseph Strayer, renowned historian of the 20th century, once explained how 
difficult it was to justify historical research to scientists because historical 
methods are ―more of an art than a science.‖25 
However, in defense of history and historiography as a valid social 
scientific methodology, more arguments favor the approach than undermine it. 
Stephen Bahn26 concluded, based on Frank Kermode's differentiating of history27 
and fiction and John Cannon‘s28 critique on the use of present-day bias to 
analyze past historical events, that historians and other history practitioners 
should work even harder on what distinguishes history from fiction:  
If the difference between history and fiction is indeed not a 
cognitive one, but an institutional or more precisely a cultural one, 
then it is none the less a difference of extreme importance. And its 
recognition should lead not indeed to skepticism about the 
―philosophic base‖ of historiography, but to a renewed investigation 
of the discursive form of that ―history‖ to which we rightly give such 
                                                 
24
 Most ancient oriental cultures and even powerful civilizations of the West like the Maya, Incas and 
Aztecs believed in cyclical time. 
25
 Joseph R. Strayer, introduction to The Interpretation of History, ed. Joseph R. Strayer (New York: Peter 
Smith, 1950), 3-26, 3. 
26
 Bahn, Stephen. “Towards a Critical Historiography: Recent Work in Ph ilosophy of History.” Philosophy 
56, no. 217 (1981): 365-385. 
27
 Frank Kermode. The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative (Cambridge, MA, and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1979). 
28
 John Cannon, ed.. The Historian at Work  (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1980). 
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a privileged position. In other words, the awareness that historical 
narrative has no cognitive privilege over fictional narrative should 
not result in a mere recrudescence of the conventional barrier 
between the two. It should result in the employment of all the 
diverse and sophisticated methods of literary analysis to tell us 
more about what remains, none the less, the unique province of 
history.29  
 
All research methodologies have limitations and a good part of those 
limitations can be attributed to a poor understanding of methodological processes 
in first place. History is no different. David Hackett Fischer30 wrote: ―The vital 
purpose of refining and extending a logic of historical thought is not merely some 
pristine goal of scholarly perfection. It involves the issue of survival.‖ 
Loren Eiseley31 once wrote about the need for history and a 
methodological understanding of the past: 
Their world, therefore, becomes increasingly the violent, 
unpredictable world of the first men simply because, in losing faith 
in the past, one is inevitably forsaking all that enables man to be a 
planning animal. For man's story, in brief, is essentially that of a 
creature who has abandoned instinct and replaced it with cultural 
tradition and the hard-won increments of contemplative thought. 
The lessons of the past have been found to be a reasonably secure 
instruction for proceeding against the unknown future. To hurl 
oneself recklessly, without method, upon a future that we ourselves 
have complicated is a sheer nihilistic rejection of all that history, 
including the classical world, can teach us. 
 
According to this view, history is a method of survival, an intellectual 
arsenal to understand what has been in order to inform what will come. The loss 
                                                 
29
 Bahn, “Towards a Crit ical Historiography,” 368. 
30
 David Hackett Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought. (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 1970), 317.  
31
 Eiseley, Loren. “Activis m and the Rejection of History.” Science, New Series, 165, no. 3889 (Ju l. 11, 
1969), 129. 
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of history can do great damage to society, as seen in the Middle Ages, which 
threw human civilization into shambles for more than a thousand years.  In that 
time, people lived short lives, virtually imprisoned by localism and suffocated by 
ignorance and superstition. Devastating diseases such as the black plague and 
constant wars were the lot of that brutish time.32 Most of the knowledge lost 
during the Dark Ages (especially in medicine, mechanics and engineering) are 
finally beginning to be recovered through archaeology and history after being 
completely submerged for centuries. More than that, history is, according to 
Michel Foucault, ―the first and as it were the mother of all the sciences of man, 
and is perhaps as old as human memory.‖33 
History, as a methodological approach, is a powerful tool to reveal what 
no other scientific methodology can: a contextually rich understanding of how 
phenomena and events are born and developed and, most importantly, how they 
relate to other phenomena and events. Fischer34 argued that history, when 
properly done, can be useful in ―several substantive ways.‖35 According to him, 
history clarifies and contextualizes contemporary problems by exposing empirical 
evidence of the causality of events; it provides content for scientific forecasting36 
by establishing historical trends. It helps refine theoretical knowledge by 
shedding light on the historical conditions in which an event or phenomenon 
                                                 
32
 William Manchester. A World Lit Only by Fire: The Medieval Mind and the Renaissance: Portrait of an 
Age (Boston; London: Little, Brown and Company, 1993) 
33
 Michel Foucault. The Order of Things (London and New York: Routledge Classics, 2008). 
34
 Fischer, Historians’ Fallacies, 315-318. 
35
 Ibid. 315. 
36
 Although it can be argued that scientific forecasting constitutes nothing but informed guesses, it  is thanks 
to historical knowledge that they are, at least, “informed.”  
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happened. It aids in the quest for self understanding and the acceptance of 
others by showing that all societies are results of historical choices and 
processes. Once aware of those processes, people can make better choices in 
the future. Finally, history can help people to become better and more conscious 
thinkers by providing an understanding of cause and consequence of any given 
action. Fischer suggested that such understanding of history may help instill a 
feeling of responsibility for people‘s actions as they can understand their 
consequences based on past similar events. However, Fischer argued that, in 
order for history to be useful, historians need to refine their practices and 
understandings of the historiographic process.37  
According to Jacques Barzun, the criteria by which history may be known 
are four: Narrative, Chronology, Concreteness, and Memorability. History is, 
before all things, a story (Narrative) that gives particulars of change within time 
and place (Chronology) based on what actually happened (Concreteness)—and 
not on ideas and philosophical conjectures – about an event that is both worth 
remembering and capable of being remembered (Memorability).38 
After an avalanche of healthy cultural criticism against positivism and 
positivistic history, Fischer argued that the result, instead of the betterment of 
historiography was the abandonment of methodological rigor in the field. 
According to Fischer, in the place of looking to improve the intrinsic 
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methodological logic, historians embraced a ―hate‖ for it, or as Fischer called it, 
historians embraced ―misology.‖39 
To correct misology without repeating the mistakes of early positivistic 
historians,40 Fischer described a list of common mistakes, or ―fallacies,‖ 
historians in general commit. Fischer‘s work provided a useful introduction to 
―committing‖ good historiography, but certainly not enough.  Logic is important in 
historical cultural criticism as cultural criticism is essential in the interpretation of 
history. Historical methodology emphasizing the use of artifacts and primary 
sources not only improves accuracy, but also the contextualization of the 
historical moment through a diverse and comprehensive use of primary sources. 
As importantly, the interpretation of history should always expose the cultural 
contextualization of the time of the event and not reflect present-day bias. 
Bahn also showed how the sophistication process can be advanced by 
drawing on the French Annalles school and on Michel Foucault‘s writings in 
developing a truly critical historiography. Although Bahn uphe ld Foucault‘s 
method as the ultimate example of sophistication, he also observed that Foucault 
worked from an advantage because his analyses came later; they are an 
analytical history of the historical method itself.  
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―To say that now we all more or less take cultural history for granted does 
not, of course, mean that we all understand it in the same way,‖ wrote Barzun41 
in 1956. My approach for this dissertation draws on cultural and critical history 
following specific understandings from specific scholars and historians. The 
historical method I follow in this work originated from Walter Benjamin‘s concept 
of cultural history, which built on and improved the original definition provided by 
Jacob Burckhardt in the mid 1800s.42 Benjamin43 started his conceptualization of 
history by appropriating some of Friedrich Engels‘s interpretations, especially 
Engels‘s idea that the understanding of the history of ideas as a logical 
progression represented a new dogma. Benjamin transformed that argument into 
a harsh critique of the assumption of continuous historical development as an 
eternal image of the past. For Benjamin, historical materialism exposed the 
historical narrative as a unique experience of the past that is ―directed toward a 
consciousness of the present which explodes the continuum of history.‖44  In his 
concept, ―To bring about the consolidation of experience with history, which is 
original for every present, is the task of historical materialism.‖45 
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After Benjamin, many historians, philosophers, social scientists, and 
humanists tried to define the role of history and historiography in light of the new 
self awareness of history practitioners and philosophers. ―In modern thought, 
historicism and the analytic of finitude confront one another,‖ Foucault wrote. 
―Historicism is a means to validating for itself the perpetual critical relation at play 
between History and the human sciences,‖46 he continued. In Foucault‘s view, we 
can never fully dismiss historicism, but, at the same time, we need to put 
historicism in check by providing a full critique which exposes the reasons behind 
the justifications provided by historicism: 
This is why the analysis of finitude never ceases to use, as a 
weapon against historicism, the part of itself that historicism has 
neglected: its aim is to reveal, at the foundation of all the positivities 
and before them, the finitude that makes them possible; where 
historicism sought for the possibility and justification of concrete 
relations between limited totalities, whose mode of being was 
predetermined by life, or by social forms, or by the significations of 
language, the analytic of finitude tries to question this relation of 
human being to the being which, by designating finitude, renders 
the positivities possible in their concrete mode of being.47 
 
It is important to notice that Foucault‘s understood historicism as the 
historians‘ common practice of providing a justification for past events and 
actions. According to him, the problem with this practice is that the reasons 
behind any event or action may not be knowable or, worse, not even have 
existed. In that way, this practice can be used to manufacture historical 
justifications for present actions, which Foucault opposed. Fischer, another 
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antagonist of historicism, calls it a pernicious error, converting a temporal 
sequence into an ethical system or ―history into morality.‖ 48 
Mark Jarzombek called historiography ―the dialectical equivalent in history 
of the modernist notion of self-consciousness,‖49 thus, he continued a few 
paragraphs later, ―a Critical Historiography … functions on the principle that 
history … [is] only as strong as the historiography that simultaneously critiques 
[it].‖50 The work of historiography is to reveal the holes, viewpoints, interests, and 
discontinuities in history in order to provide a fair closure to the historical 
narrative, which usually tends to be absolutist.  
As Fischer proposed, logic must be found in historical methodology and 
historians must denounce fallacies wherever they find them. But the historical 
logic cannot be the mathematical logic of a simple sum, but a more complex logic 
of an equation where variables substitute for known numbers. The methodology 
also must allow room for the fact that some variables may never be known. 
Fundamentally important is the idea that the one who tells the story reveals 
her/himself as the mathematician who will determine value to those variables. As 
Jacques Barzun wrote: 
History is concrete and complex; everything in it is individual and 
entangled. Reading it, mulling it over does not weaken concern with 
the present, but it brings detachment from the immediate and thus 
cures ―the jumps‖ – seeing every untoward event as menacing, 
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every success or defeat as permanent, every opponent as a 
monster of error.51 
 
If successful in this self critique, Critical Historiography provides History 
with the sophistication Fischer and Bahn requested through the questioning of 
the process of acquiring, interpreting, narrating, and finally questioning and 
rethinking the interpretations of historical facts and artifacts. It also questions the 
position of the one who questions—meaning that it has an inherent self critique. 
In this system, History becomes much more powerful as an approach to 
academic research as it reveals not only the context in which the past event 
occurred, but also the context in which that past event is being analyzed in the 
present. 
This trajectory of History and Historiography as critical methods of 
research showed that, although debates about the worthiness of the 
methodology will go on, most of the arguments against the historical method are 
arguments against the errors of practitioners and not against the method itself. 
Good historians, as Barzun, Benjamin, Fischer, Bahn, Foucault and others have 
explained, write history based on known facts, accepting the possibility that the 
interpretation of those facts may change with the discovery of new facts. Also, 
that such interpretation cannot and should not provide justifications for past 
events based on present morality. And finally, good historians know that History, 
as Science, is a living process, and even the best evidence of a period can be 
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proven wrong or different with new findings. That awareness, instead of 
weakening the method, constitutes its strongest characteristic.   
Research purpose and justification 
The purpose of this research is to explore the historical development and 
importance of the ideological concept of right to know in EPCRA as an example 
of the ―legislation for revelation‖ approach to public policy.  Such an approach is 
important to the study of Communication because the enforcement and success 
of the right-to-know policies depend almost solely in the ability of the public to 
receive, understand, process, use, and distribute information. 
To achieve this purpose, this dissertation presents an historical analysis 
based on primary sources of how the right-to-know principle was discussed and 
included in the legislation as its main characteristic. This dissertation also 
includes both legal and academic literature with the goal of revealing the 
opportunities such laws as EPCRA present to communicators, especially in the 
intersection of environmental and risk communication. 
Therefore, this research aims to offer: 1) an accurate account of the 
historical implementation of EPCRA focusing on the right-to-know principle it 
bears; 2) a contextualization of the social-political environment surrounding 
EPCRA‘s proposition and implementation; and 3) a critical insight into what 
EPCRA represents to an open and democratic political process through the 
perspective of environmental risk communication.  
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The focus of this dissertation is the concept of the right to know in 
EPCRA, a federal law with a well-defined scope of regulating information about 
environmental risks involving the release of toxic and hazardous materials. The 
appearance or mention of any other concept, event, movement, or law in this 
dissertation has the sole purpose of providing context on the dissertation‘s topic. 
To dwell on any other subject, concept, or law would be an enterprise worthy of 
many tomes, some of which have already been written and are cited in this 
dissertation.  
As such, any investigation of the history of state legislations and other 
federal laws was avoided except as they were pertinent to the development of 
the concept of right to know and/or an essential part of EPCRA‘s history. 
Furthermore, it is not the purpose of this study to provide an in-depth legal 
analysis of EPCRA as such analysis has been provided elsewhere extensively.52 
The methodological choice for this study was based on two core problems 
linked to the research question: first, the need to fill the gap created by the 
absence of a thorough historical account of this particular law and, second, the 
importance of context in this analysis. History, as explained above, is the only 
methodological approach that can both reveal the intrinsic details of a past event 
                                                 
52
 Besides the various manuals and legal sources for the application of EPCRA, see: June C. Bolstridge. 
EPCRA Data: A guide to the information on industrial facilities and chemical available under the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1992); 
Shapiro, “Equity and Information”; Durham-Hammer, Kathryn E., 2004, “Left to Wonder: Reevaluating, 
Reforming, and Implement ing the Emergency Planning and Community Right -to-know Act of 1986,” 
Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 29: 323-357;  Weeks, “The Bumpy Road to Community 
Preparedness;” Green, Krista. “An Analysis of the Supreme Court‟s Resolution of the Emergency Planning 
and Community Right-to-know Act Citizen Su it Debate.” Boston College Environmental Affairs Law 
Review 26, no. 387 (Winter, 1999);  Dudley, Susan E. 2004. “It is Time to Reevaluate the Toxic Release 
Inventory.” Missouri Environmental Law & Policy Review 12, no. 1. 
 27 
and expose the context in which it occurred based on documents, registries and 
other primary sources produced at the time of the event.  
Research question 
What are the origins of the right-to-know principle in EPCRA and how was 
it developed and discussed in the process of writing and imp lementing the law?  
Methodological application and analysis  
In order to answer the research question, a review of the academic, 
scientific, and legal literature was conducted on EPCRA, right to know, 
environmental justice, environmental communication, risk communication, risk 
society, accidents involving the spill of toxic and hazardous materials, lawsuits 
(especially the ones that reached the Supreme Court), community participation in 
decision and policy making, environmental history, environmental sociology, and 
environmental policy and law.  
The second step was to look into official documents53 on EPCRA‘s 
implementation, the first writings about EPCRA during the process of its proposal 
and after its adoption, and the legal and academic literature addressing EPCRA 
since then. It is important to highlight that, during this process, the amount of 
disagreement in the literature forced the researcher to take a deeper look into the 
original writings of authors whose ideas were instrumental to the development of 
a concept of right to know. The process resulted in so many findings that the 
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researcher chose to make the origins of the right to know concept a separate 
chapter from the literature review. A historiographic approach was applied to both 
chapters 2 and 4. The historiographic work consisted of:  
1) Identifying primary sources: First, the researcher used the citations in 
the literature as a starting point. Also, the researcher made several searches in 
Lexis Nexis (Academic, Congressional, and Environmental) in order to find news 
and opinion articles, legal reviews, official records, and other documents. The 
searches all used the ―all dates‖ parameters and used a combination of Boolean 
term searches, like Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act; 
EPCRA; right to know; right-to-know; toxic*;54 hazardous*; community*; Toxic 
Release Inventory; TRI; Florio; Superfund; SARA; Comprehensive Environmental 
Resource, Compensation, and Liability Act; and CERCLA.  
Second, once a document was located in a specific archive, the 
researcher searched for a digital photographic copy or a reliable transcription of 
that document. Reliability was determined by a triangulation of the text of the 
document in different digital collections, especially if a copy was found in the 
websites of the Library of Congress, the National Archives, or the original 
newspaper of publication. Third, once a document was deemed reliable, it was 
used to locate other documents on the same topic. A personal lette r from 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison usually indicates if it was a response to a 
query or if it requested a response from the other party, for example. Sometimes, 
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a letter or document cited another letter or document. This process also added a 
new layer to the reliability check as it confirmed the temporality of a document by 
its mention in another document of the time. Finally, the last check was a 
thorough reading of the documents in search for any idiosyncrasies in the 
content of the documents with their related historical contexts. All documents and 
letters cited in this dissertation passed all stages of this first step.   
2) Contextualizing: The literature was conflicting about certain 
generalizations, mostly due to different interpretations based on the authors‘ 
diverse backgrounds (a lawyer would pay more attention to legal implications and 
a sociologist to social ones) or different methodological approaches and 
viewpoints. In order to recreate the historical context, the researcher went back 
to the primary sources and tried to identify the events that were happening as the 
authors of the original documents were writing to avoid temporal biases. Then, 
the researcher followed the line of the discussion (letters and speeches usually 
prompted responses) in other to establish not only the topic of discussion, but 
also to understand the original authors‘ positions in relation to the topic. Finally, 
by studying the biographies and expressed opinions of specific authors and 
tracing them through time, the researcher could define a general idea of the 
authors‘ views on specific topics related to this research.  
3) Interpreting: Each document offered a clue to both its causality and its 
intentionality, especially the transcriptions of the Congressional meetings about 
the first Constitution of the United States, the deliberative open sessions about 
the enactment of EPCRA to inform the letter of the law before its constituency, 
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and the writings of the Founding Fathers of the United States. During the 
deliberative sessions about EPCRA, for example, different parties had the 
chance to express their opinions on what and how they believed the legislation 
should regulate. Those documents were essential in the appreciation of the 
importance or irrelevance of interpretations offered after EPCRA‘s 
implementation. They also made it possible to make comparisons with its 
applications and effects based on the legal and scientific literature.  
Based on the process of contextualization, the resulting interpretation of 
the events and concepts were then contrasted with the interpretations of different 
authors in the literature. Some of these contrasts were added to the text of the 
dissertation in order to give the reader a fair comparison between two or more 
interpretations. 
4) Narrating: In chapter 2, the researcher opted for a historical narrative 
style that allowed for revisionism as required by the conflicting literature. The 
objective was to produce a logical sequence of facts and concepts that also 
exposed the different views of other researchers about the same topic. In chapter 
4, the historical narrative is less permissive as there are very few sources for 
comparison. As this is an original attempt to provide a complete documental 
history of the right to know principle in EPCRA, the scarcity of interpretations 
about most of the facts and events forced the narrative into a more authoritative 
tone. A list of documentation was added as an Appendix for ease of reference 
rather than being mixed with the body of the dissertation where it would have 
created pauses in the flow of the narrative. 
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5) Limitations: For lack of travel funding, the search for primary sources 
was limited to resources available online and at libraries in Knoxville, Tennessee. 
However, thanks to digitization efforts of dozens of governmental and non-
governmental organizations,55 pictures and transcriptions of almost all historical 
documents and letters analyzed in this dissertation could be found.56 However, 
the fact that the documents used here were found does not account for 
documents that might exist and could only be found by a physical examination of 
private archives. That search will be the next step of this research, including oral 
history interviews with people who have participated in the history of EPCRA who 
are still alive. That step should add a better understanding of the intentions of 
those participants and might result in revealing new sources of documents that 
may shed light on more intimate and less public discussions about EPCRA and 
the right to know. More than 5,000 letters, newspaper articles, official records, 
and other documents57 were reviewed for this study. Some details may have 
been overlooked or documents missed altogether. If additional documents or 
details are uncovered, they will be part of this project in the future.    
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CHAPTER 2: THE IDEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF A “RIGHT” TO KNOW 
Liberty only flourishes where reason and knowledge are 
encouraged; and wherever the latter are stifled, the former is 
extinguished.  
The Centinel (Samuel Bryan)58 
 
The right to know, as an idea and not a legal right, 59 evolved in two 
distinct periods. In its pre-conceptual form, it was a right to be educated about 
the purposes of government and to be informed about the actions of government 
as formulated by John Milton, William Bollan, Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Paine, 
George Mason, John Wilson, and James Madison. In its contemporary 
understanding, especially following Susan Hadden‘s definition,60 the people‘s 
right to know is a mechanism to empower people through education and 
knowledge so they can watch over their governments and industries and improve 
their lives. In this chapter, the ideological concept of a right to know will be 
presented in a historiographic narrative of the academic literature and original 
documentation of two distinct periods. The first part focuses on the 
conceptualizations of a right to know from the period before the War for 
Independence to the enactment of the Bill of Rights. The second presents the 
evolution of the right to know in the American legislation from the publishing of 
Harold Cross‘s The People’s Right to Know in 1953 to the implementation of 
EPCRA.  
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An instrumental right 
Since the earliest debates on American independence and during the 
period from the Articles of the Confederation to the enactment of the Bill of 
Rights, the ideas of freedom and self-governance were in the forefront of the 
revolutionary discussions.61 Thomas Jefferson, drafter of the Declaration of 
Independence, made part of the Declaration a list of accusations against King 
George III of England. His accusations62 negatively revealed the values that the 
founders of the United States63 considered to be moral inalienable rights of any 
free American. Before listing what he believed were unacceptable crimes against 
the American people, Jefferson laid out the basic characteristics of a free and 
more democratic government system.  
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain 
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments 
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are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed64 
 
The ideas that the power of a government comes from the people and that 
the role of government is to serve the people in their pursuit of freedom and 
happiness were revolutionary in the times of monarchies. Especially insulting to a 
monarch was the submission of government to the rule of the people. Many of 
the rights Jefferson accused King George III of restricting were a direct reflection 
on the belief this group of revolutionaries had on self-governance and economic 
independence.65  Among those rights, Kiul Uhm argued that the right to know can 
be found in the text of the Declaration66 in which Jefferson accused King George 
III of England of making it virtually impossible for the American people to find out 
information about the British government‘s actions:  
He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, 
uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their Public 
Records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance 
with his measures.67 
 
Jefferson‘s words in the text of the Declaration may be interpreted by later 
generations as reflecting the need for knowledge of the purposes of government 
and accessible information about the acts of government for society to function. It 
became a common theme in the colonies for people to be fined for not following 
a new law that they never knew existed. Jefferson knew that, if a real democracy 
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were to prevail in the newly formed United States of America,68 the only way 
people could retain such power was if society was informed about their choices 
and took active part in the political process.69  
For Jefferson, the concept of  a right to know was more than a simple right 
to access information, but it included the right to be educated about the functions 
of the government, so people (through the works of the p ress) could watch and 
control the actions of government. In a letter to Edward Carrington in January, 
1787, which became famous for Jefferson‘s remark that he would rather have 
newspapers without government than the contrary, the underlying circumstances 
of that choice are generally left out.70 ―But I should mean that every man should 
receive those papers, and be capable of reading them,‖ Jefferson wrote right 
after the famous passage. In the letter, Jefferson explains his views: 
I am persuaded myself that the good sense of the people will 
always be found to be the best army. They may be led astray for a 
moment, but will soon correct themselves. The people are the only 
censors of their governors: and even their errors will tend to keep 
these to the true principles of their insti tution. To punish these 
errors too severely would be to suppress the only safeguard of the 
public liberty. The way to prevent these irregular interpositions of 
the people is to give them full information of their affairs thro‘ the 
channel of the public papers, & to contrive that those papers should 
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penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of our 
governments being the opinion of the people, the very first object 
should be to keep that right; and were it left to me to decide 
whether we should have a government without newspapers or 
newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment 
to prefer the latter.71 
 
From the quote above, it seems that Jefferson believed at that time in 
unrestricted disclosure as a form to keep the whole of the people informed about 
public affairs. That mix of education and information was, according to Jefferson, 
fundamental to protect the right he considered the most important of all, freedom 
of opinion. Therefore, Jefferson believed that the right to a thoroughly informed 
opinion was the very basis of a fair system and the only protection people have 
against their governments. Almost in a prophetic passage,72 Jefferson wrote: 
Cherish therefore the spirit of our people, and keep alive their 
attention. Do not be too severe upon their errors, but reclaim them 
by enlightening them. If once they become inattentive to the public 
affairs, you & I, & Congress & Assemblies, judges & governors 
shall all become wolves. It seems to be the law of our general 
nature, in spite of individual exceptions; and experience declares 
that man is the only animal which devours his own kind, for I can 
apply no milder term to the governments of Europe, and to the 
general prey of the rich on the poor.73 
 
Jefferson was not the first one to come up with such complex notion about 
a right to knowledge and information. The idea that the decision-making process 
should be carried out by informed citizens can be traced back to the ancient 
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Greeks. Plato declared in The Republic that philosophers would be the best to 
govern a republic as they were the most knowledgeable. Although, seemly an 
elitist remark, Plato like his mentor, Socrates, and his pupil, Aristotle, believed 
that education should be for all.74 Euripides, the famed Athenian tragedian and 
admirer of Socrates, wrote the verses that became inspirational to John Milton‘s 
Areopagitica, enunciating the importance of the freedom of opinion in a 
republican government:  
This is true Liberty when free born men 
Having to advise the public may speak free, 
Which he who can, and will, deserves high praise, 
Who neither can nor will, may hold his peace 
What can be juster in a State than this?75 
 
Euripides‘s words reflect his times as he denoted ―free born men‖ as not 
including slaves and women. Milton himself is heralded as one of the first 
defenders of a free press76 in Western Europe, more than a thousand years after 
Euripides, as Jefferey Smith wrote:  
The idea of employing toleration and active participation in the 
pursuit of truth was given no more lasting or deeply humanistic 
expression in the seventeenth century than in Areopagitica, A 
Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, To 
the Parliament of England.77  
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In Areopagitica, Milton wrote: "Give me liberty to know, to utter, and to 
argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties."78 More than the 
freedom of speech defended by Euripides, Milton expressly included the ―liberty 
to know‖ in its defense of a free press;79 words that would reverberate in the 
minds of the authors behind the American Revolution more then two centuries 
later. Smith lists a dozen of other authors that, in some level, linked freedom of 
expression to the idea of educated citizenry between the 17 th and 18th 
centuries.80  
In the period of the American and French revolutions, political activist, 
pamphleteer, and inventor Thomas Paine81 actively participated in both 
revolutions and constantly wrote against the King of England and the monarchic 
system. His pamphlet Common Sense, which he signed ―an Englishman,‖ sold 
more than 100,000 copies, becoming the biggest bestseller in the 2 million-free-
citizen colony. He saw little or no revenue from it.  Paine‘s Common Sense was 
the first direct attack on the King of England published during the run-up to the 
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Declaration of Independence. However, more than a direct attack against the 
English king, Common Sense was a reflection of Paine‘s democratic and liberal 
thinking.82 Even its style was accessible to the general public revealing Paine‘s 
absolute distaste for elites and hierarchies, as historian Merrill Jensen83 wrote: 
Some newspaper writers had argued for independence at least as 
early as 1773, but it was the publication of Common Sense on 9 
January 1776  that set a ―terrible wordy war waging on the subject 
of independence.‖84  
 
Jensen continued: 
The ideas in Common Sense were not new, for most of them had 
appeared in dozens of newspapers and pamphlets. What was 
different about Common Sense was its stirring prose, so unlike 
most of the ponderous political writings of the times.85 
 
Paine‘s work was instrumental to the right to know concept as it fostered 
the ideas of self-government and of republic (as ―thing belonging to the people‖). 
Paine, like Jefferson, believed that society‘s power lay in the hands of the people 
and therefore the public, and not a king, should be responsible for the decision 
making. In such way, the public should be enlightened enough to do so.86  
A mix of antagonism against the tyrannical ways of the King of England 
and all monarchies and praise for the virtues of a democratic republic based 
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mostly on the writings of Milton and Locke, Common Sense quickly became a 
bible for any American discontent with the British ruling. Common Sense is 
above all a praise for self-governance and people‘s empowerment against 
governments in general.  
Society in every state is a blessing, but Government, even in its 
best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst state an intolerable 
one: for when we suffer, or are exposed to the same miseries BY A 
GOVERNMENT, which we might expect in a country WITHOUT 
GOVERNMENT, our calamity is heightened by reflecting that we 
furnish the means by which we suffer.87 
 
Like Milton before him, Paine believed that an informed citizenry was the 
best defense against an abusive government. In the ―Applying Principle to 
Practice Preface‖ of the second edition of The Rights of Men, he wrote: 
The defects of every government and constitution both as to 
principle and form, must, on a parity of reasoning, be as open to 
discussion as the defects of a law, and it is a duty which every man 
owes to society to point them out. When those defects, and the 
means of remedying them, are generally seen by a nation, that 
nation will reform its government or its constitution in the one case, 
as the government repealed or reformed the law in the other. The 
operation of government is restricted to the making and the 
administering of laws; but it is to a nation that the right of forming or 
reforming, generating or regenerating constitutions and 
governments belong; and consequently those subjects, as subjects 
of investigation, are always before a country as a matter of right, 
and cannot, without invading the general rights of that country, be 
made subjects for prosecution.88 
 
In this passage, Paine not only exalted the importance of openness in 
government, he laid the foundation of the ideas of both freedom of speech as a 
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―duty to point [the defects of government] out‖ and a right to form and reform the 
acts of government, including the constitution of that government, without fearing 
prosecution. These ideas, that the people will fix the problems of a nation through 
the debate of ideas are also reflected in Jefferson‘s declarations as shown 
earlier. 
The right to know only appears in Paine‘s writings later in his life with The 
Rights of Man as he participated actively in the preparation of the Declaration of 
the Rights of Man and of Citizens by The National Assembly of France. In The 
Rights of Man, he included the text of the Declaration of the Rights of Man, which 
brought a version of the right to know in one of its seventeen items: ―Fifteen: 
Every community has a right to demand of all its agents an account of their 
conduct.‖ For Paine, likewise for Jefferson, the right to know was an instrumental 
right to secure all other rights. Both of them might have followed William Bollan‘s 
idea of an instrumental right to free examination of public measures. 
[T]he free examination of public measures, with a proper 
representation by speech or writing of the sense resulting from that 
examination, is the right of the members of a free state, and 
requisite for the preservation of their other rights.89 
 
Referring to the right to know, Uhm said that ―eighteen-century Americans 
clearly understood its conceptual implications for democratic republicanism.‖90 
Although, Uhm‘s remark might be exaggerated, the letters from Jefferson, 
                                                 
89
 William Bollan, the Freedom of Speech and Writings Uppon Public Affairs, Considered, with a 
Historical View (London: S. Baker, 1766), 3. 
90
 Uhm, “The founders and the revolutionary underpinning of the concept of the right to know,” 397. See 
also Joel D. Meyers, “The Private Revolution of William Bollan ,” The New England Quarterly 41, no. 4 
(Dec., 1968), 536-550. 
 42 
Madison, Mason, and Paine, are evidence that at least, some (very few probably) 
knew in different levels the instrumental importance of a right to know. Other 
historians have also identified the common belief among educated Americans of 
the period of the American Revolution that an informed and educated citizenry 
was necessary to support a legitimate government.91 
Paine shared with Jefferson the idea that a legitimate government draws 
its power from the people. Only by consent of people properly educated on the 
purposes of government and duly informed about government‘s actions could a 
government avoid tyranny and amend errors.92 Jefferson‘s concept of right to 
know might not have been directly influenced by Paine, but the fact that their 
friendship, mutual respect, common literary influences, and resonance of ideas 
may indicate that, at least, some indirect inspiration might have taken place .93 
A more accepted influence for Jefferson‘s draft of the Declaration of 
Independence came from Virginia Declaration of Rights, written by George 
Mason.94 The similarities between Jefferson‘s and Mason‘s documents seem 
evident from the first paragraph: 
That all men are by nature equally free and independent and have 
certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of 
society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their 
posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means 
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of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining 
happiness and safety.95 
 
The core idea of Mason‘s document is summarized in the second 
paragraph: ―That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the 
people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants and at all times 
amenable to them.‖96 Mason‘s text would later become an obvious source for the 
Bill of Rights, added to the Constitution on December 15, 1791, by ratification by 
the states.97 
Mason, a participant in the Convention in Philadelphia refused to sign the 
1787 Constitution because it lacked a Bill of Rights. His second major complaint 
against the Constitutional Assembly was the lack of public access to its activities:  
In the House of Representatives there is not the substance, but the 
shadow only of representation; which can never produce proper 
information in the legislature, or inspire confidence in the people.—
The laws will, therefore, be generally made by men little concerned 
in, and unacquainted with their effects and consequences.98 
 
Finally, Mason accused the Assembly of not protecting the freedom of 
press, among other fundamental rights.99 For Mason, without the Bill of Rights 
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and the formation of a formal constitutional council to inform and protect the 
president from misinformation and alienation, the Constitution did nothing but 
created a ―moderate aristocracy,‖ which he believed would end up becoming ―a 
monarchy, or a corrupt oppressive aristocracy; it will most probably vibrate some 
years between the two, and then terminate in the one or the other.‖100 
This view was reflected by Jefferson‘s close friend and neighboring 
planter, James Madison, who was to be the major force in proposing and drafting 
the Bill of Rights urged in letters from Jefferson:101 
A popular Government, without popular information, or the means 
of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, 
perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a 
people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves 
with the power which knowledge gives.102 
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Although Madison and Mason were foes during the preparation of the 
Constitution,103 both shared the idea that the public had a right to know about the 
acts of government. During the Constitutional Convention, a few representatives 
shared the idea that most of the rights later included in the Bill of Rights were 
obvious assumptions of the new nation and there was no need to expressly write 
them into the text of law as the power to constrain those rights was not given to 
Congress or to the President.104  
The main concern for Madison was to get a Constitution ready and 
approved as speedily as possible as he feared that any delays might completely 
stop the creation of the new republic. The object of the Constitutional Convention 
was a counter-revolution to create a national government. The Anti-Federalists 
argued strenuously about the dangers of creating a Leviathan that would crush 
liberties. The Federalists, with Madison in the lead, worked out a compromise to 
promise a Bill of Rights so the states of Virginia and New York would ratify the 
Constitution. Without those two states, the new Constitution would not have 
worked. The government started in 1789 after the Constitution was ratified, but 
the Federalist-ruled Congress only submitted the Bill of Rights to the states. On 
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December 15, 1791, sufficient states had ratified to put the Bill of Rights into 
effect. 
Madison was not blind to the people‘s right to know.  Together with John 
Rutledge, Madison tried to require that each House would keep a journal of its 
proceedings, which should be published from time to time.105 The rejection of 
Madison and Rutledge‘s motion ended up becoming the spark that caused 
James Wilson to expressly defend the right to know: ―The people have a right to 
know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the 
opinion of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings.‖106 Mason added that an 
explicitly written requirement would give the people ―a just alarm‖ of the abuse 
and a basis to ―make a conclave of their Legislature.‖107 
Although the right to know was expressly included neither in the 
Constitution nor in the Bill of Rights, it became a pillar in the defense of openness 
in government and of democratic processes in the American society.108 Uhm 
declared that the idea of the right to know was not only present, but was part of 
the daily discussions among the Founding Fathers of the United States and the 
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framers of the American Constitution. Again, this might be an overstatement, but 
both personal letters and journal articles seem to show that the topic was present 
at the time, just neither on a daily basis nor widespread.109 
Authors, activists, and/or politicians like Paine, Jefferson, Wilson, 
Madison, and even Anti-Federalists like Mason, ―The Centinel‖ (Samuel Bryan), 
―Cato,‖ (probably Governor George Clinton) and the ―Federal Farmer‖ (Richard 
Henry Lee) all shared an understanding of a concept of right to know not only as 
a right to access information from the government, but as a right to be educated 
about the purposes of government and its activities in order to make educated 
and informed judgments about their own lives and their futures. They might not 
have understood a right to know in anything like a 21st century sense.110 Yet 
words can take on a life of their own.   
It was the slaveholder Jefferson who wrote ―all men are created equal‖ in 
the Declaration of Independence.  From the advocacy of people bui lding a 
revolution, an imperative for citizens to know more fully about the meetings and 
decisions of government bodies surfaced.  The language sometimes used was 
not inconsistent with a more modern concept of ―right to know.‖  Perhaps a broad 
theory of a right to know may have been emerging as long ago as the War for 
Independence and the adoption of the Constitution and, two years later, of the 
Bill of Rights. 
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 Unfortunately, there isn‘t much evidence of any formal discussions 
about the right to know between the period after the death of James Madison and 
the end of World War II. It is possible that after losing the battle for its inclusion in 
the Bill and the death of the most prominent defenders of the right to know, the 
debate simply turned to other issues. The modern right-to-know movement came 
as a backlash against the growth of the American security state after World War 
II, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. 
The Right to Know and American Freedom of Information: Agitation and 
Legislation of the 1950s and 1960s  
Before EPCRA, the first attempts to establish a right to know came from a 
few legal scholars and from journalists, notably from Sigma Delta Chi (precursor 
of the Society of Professional Journalists) during the 1950s. Harold Cross, a 
retired attorney for a newspaper, made the term ―right to know‖ popular with the 
publication of The Public’s Right to Know, in which he wrote his findings in a 
study of access to government information, focusing especially on the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946 for the American Society of 
Newspapers Editors. Section 3 of APA made some matters of official record 
available to ―persons properly and directly concerned.‖111 However, Cross found 
that the vague text of the law and the poorly defined exemptions were used by 
agencies to deny access to information and not to make it available.112 Cross‘s 
findings prompted a series of analyses and essays on the right to know, 
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especially on the 11 years of hearings for the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 
(FOIA), an amendment to APA signed by President Lyndon Johnson. Wallace 
Parks described the political climate on the access to governmental information 
during that decade: 
The withholding of government information is currently a subject of 
general interest and considerable controversy in the United States. 
In spite of the vast volume of government publications and releases 
of various types, many skilled observers of American governmental 
processes have become concerned, since the end of World War II, 
because of suppression, withholding, or delayed availability of 
information at its source. Both major parties in recent platforms 
have promised to free government information pertaining to the 
national government.113 
 
Parks also listed the main complaints of journalists and difficulties faced 
by the public, even legislators, while trying to get access to governmental 
activities: 
Among the conditions which have been alleged and criticized are 
the following: (1) records, background reports, and proceedings 
frequently are not available or open to the press, interested parties, 
specialists, or to the Members and Committees of the Congress; (2) 
many officials are not responsive when questions are put to them 
even by legislators; (3) a growing trend to release information only 
through high agency officials; (4) many releases and publications 
are inadequate, tardy, slanted, politically motivated, or paternalistic 
- including reports required by law to be submitted to the Congress; 
(5) much vital information has been classified or refused release 
under security regulations which is readily available to potential 
enemies or of little if any security importance; (6) indirect 
restrictions are applied to scientific, press, and other 
communications outside the government.114 
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Under protests from journalists and the general public, the House 
Committee on Government Operations created a subcommittee on government 
information under the direction of John Moss in 1955.  Robert Blanchard argued 
that the 173 hearings under the Moss established the foundations for a new 
information policy, although the amendments to APA recommended by Moss‘s 
subcommittee were repeatedly thwarted by a lack of interest by the Judiciary 
Committee that oversaw Moss‘s subcommittee.115 
During that period authors generally argued for the right to access 
governmental information, but a few were more specific. Leon R. Yankwich 
argued for an ethical approach to the democratic system based on the idea of 
responsibility.116 After arguing for a ―qualified privilege‖ for reporters of 
governmental activities, Yankwich justified the right to know as instrumental for 
the watchdog function of the press. He wrote: 
In brief, if public officials and the organs of information act with full  
awareness of their moral obligation and responsibility to a 
democratic society, they will perform truly their essential function as 
instruments of free government.117 
 
Parks followed Yankwich, adding that secrecy should only be applied to 
very special cases and that openness should be the rule: 
From the standpoint of the principles of good government under 
accepted American political ideas, there can be little question but 
that open government and information availability should be the 
general rule from which exceptions should be made only where 
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there are substantial rights, interests, and considerations requiring 
secrecy or confidentiality and these are held by competent authority 
to overbalance the general public interest in openness and 
availability.118 
 
Parks also argued that the right to know had constitutional standing119 as 
the Ninth Amendment protected other rights not expressly protected in the 
Constitution and that those rights could have equal standing as the enumerated 
rights. Moreover, he argued that an interpretation of the First Amendment 
through the words of James Madison and some Supreme Court rulings gave the 
right to know a very important constitutional standing as it was fundamental to 
secure other rights: 
It is clear that the primary purpose of the freedom-of-speech and 
press clause of the First Amendment was to prevent the 
government from interfering with the communication of facts and 
views about governmental affairs, in order that all could properly 
exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship in a free 
society. This clause was intended as one of the guarantees of the 
people's right to know. Its pivotal importance to other freedoms was 
recognized clearly. In Madison's words, "... the right of freely 
examining public characters and measures, and of free 
communication thereon, is the only effective guardian of every 
other right." The Supreme Court has recognized this connection 
repeatedly. 120 
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Thomas C. Hennings, Jr., a U.S. Senator from Missouri at the time, 
became more successful in the Senate than Moss had been in the House. 
Heading the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Hennings proposed 
amendments to APA that were finally approved and signed by President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower. Nonetheless, Hennings was surprised by the president‘s 
discourse, safeguarding his own right to withhold information at the moment of 
signing of the bill that would become the Freedom of Information Act seven years 
later. Hennings wrote a cautionary article121 making a case that the Executive 
Privilege to withhold information only applies in cases of ―clear and present 
danger‖ to national security.122 
The Freedom of Information Act was the first statutory regulation that 
included a right-to-know instrument. However, as legal scholar Joseph D. 
Jacobson noted, the FOIA was ―a broader effort to establish a statutory right to 
access government information‖123 and did not include any provisions for the 
government (or corporations) to proactively inform the public about its activities.  
Although the FOIA was modified and amended several times throughout 
the years, the right in the FOIA is only for the public to be able to gain access to 
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information upon request.124  In the FOIA, concerned citizens needed first to 
know what information they were looking for and what government agency held 
that information. That arrangement, although of crucial importance, served only 
for a reactive/retrospective process and did not fit the notion of right to know as a 
right to be informed and knowledgeable about the purposes and actions of 
government, as contended by Jefferson and Madison. The right to know, as they 
envisioned and was much later defined by Susan Hadden,125 should help inform 
and educate the public about the activities of government so the public can 
choose among options or even inform the decision makers about new options.  
Three years after of the enactment of FOIA, another statute carrying a 
different version of the right to know was enacted as a direct consequence of the 
efforts of the Environmental Movement: the National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) of 1969. However, the right to know in NEPA, like in FOIA, was still not 
fully developed. 
[W]hile NEPA was certainly a groundbreaking statute in the broad 
public ―right-to-participate‖ sense, it does not clearly fit into the 
narrower ―right-to-know‖ category which is more often thought of as 
a scheme in which polluters are required to disclose their 
processes and other information. The first true right-to-know 
provision in a substantive environmental statute would not become 
law until 1986.126 
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However, in 1977 David Michael Ivester recharged the discussion on the 
right to know in his article ―The Constitutional Right to Know.‖127 Ivester started 
out with a powerful claim of the indispensability of a right to know: 
Indispensable to the continued success of our two hundred year old 
experiment in self-government is a free flow of information upon 
which individuals can make reasoned judgments. In any political 
system, those who make the decisions must have access to 
information upon which to base their decisions. Although pure 
democracy and an absolutely free flow of information are difficult, if 
not impossible, to achieve, the practical relationship between the 
two nevertheless remains unchanged. To the extent that a system 
shares responsibility for decisionmaking, information must also be 
shared.128 
 
Ivester proceeded to argue for the constitutionality of the right to know. 
According to Ivester, it was, at least in part, the intent of the framers of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights to secure the right to know, especially through 
the First Amendment. 
Although the quest for the intent of the framers is fraught with 
perils, it can reasonably be said that some recognition and 
protection of the right to know was contemplated or presumed by 
many of those who participated in the process of producing the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Indeed there is some evidence 
suggesting that the Founding Fathers intended to guarantee the 
right to know per se, that is, that the First Amendment was 
specifically intended to extend to the people a directly enforceable 
right to know about governmental affairs.129 
 
Ivester then argued about the instrumentality of the right to know in the 
framers‘ intent: 
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If, perhaps, this specific intent did not enter the minds of most of the 
framers, there is persuasive evidence, in light of the widespread 
awareness of the basic need for ―popular information, or the means 
of acquiring it,‖ that the freedom of speech and press clauses were 
intended at least as instrumental means of securing and protecting 
the right to know. In other words, assuming the framers had no 
intent to create a directly enforceable right to know, they expected 
that the guarantee of freedom of speech and press would 
effectively secure the right of the people to know about their 
government.130 
 
Ivester‘s article can be seen as another attempt to prevent the idea of a 
right to know from succumbing to government secrecy, but it also reflected the 
struggles of the late 1970s on government secrecy, especially after Jim Carter 
became president with a more liberal platform than his predecessor Gerald Ford, 
as chapter 4 reveals. The idea of a right to know before EPCRA was no more 
than an ideological concept despite the repeated claims of some scholars as 
Eugenia Zerbinos argued: ―The claims by Parks, Emerson and Ivester of a right 
to know do not withstand analysis within the rights schema.‖131 The right to know 
had no recognized legal or constitutional support. 
As Jacobson pointed out, it was only with EPCRA, that the right to know—
the right of people to be informed on issues pertaining to their lives, livelihood, 
and public policy in order to fully participate in the decision-making process—was 
finally expressly written into the text of law.132 As seen in this chapter, the right to 
know carried a series of assumptions and ideas throughout its history. The main 
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characteristics found in the literature of the different periods defines the right to 
know as an instrumental right of citizens to know about their government and 
their government‘s actions in order to secure all other rights. This concept was 
derived from the principles of self-governance, sovereignty of the people, and 
freedom of expression.  
The ideological concept of the right to know, although defended by 
different people at different times, has never been fully recognized by the 
Supreme Court or clearly stated in a federal law until EPCRA. It‘s important to 
highlight both the preventive and participatory characteristics of the right to know 
in EPCRA as they represent a true step to empower citizens to act directly in the 
policymaking process and take part in the decision making. Thus they 
differentiate EPCRA from previous laws, like the Freedom of Information Act, that 
brought a right to petition the government for information, but not a right to know 
with the preventive and participatory characteristics.  
Furthermore, EPCRA also included private corporations into the mix of 
entities that needed to make the information available, recognizing them as part 
of the group of institutions that directly affected the public interest and, therefore, 
needed to provide checks and balances on the activities that put public health at 
risk. 
The next chapter will take a look into the history of the social movements 
that helped make EPCRA become a reality.  
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The principles of the public‘s right to know, self-governance, and 
community involvement may constitute the core of EPCRA, but EPCRA‘s 
adoption was firmly grounded in actual historic events as much as in ideological 
principles. In order to contextualize the events that led to EPCRA‘s proposal and 
signing into law, this chapter will present a literature review of some of the ideas, 
theories, academic discussions, and historical antecedents focusing on the 
environment,  the movements and events that preceded EPCRA.  
The main point of this chapter is to clarify some of the underlying contexts 
that allowed EPCRA to become a different kind of approach to policy making by 
creating communication opportunities based on the right to know. The chapter 
starts with a brief description of the theoretical interpretation of the events seen in 
the 20th century through Ulrich Beck‘s Risk Society. The concept put forward by 
Beck is important to this analysis mainly because it became a highly mentioned 
theoretical framework among environmental justice scholars . It provided a 
justification that addressed much of the needs of the Environmental Justice 
Movement. Beck was not the first to work with the idea of risk, but for scholars 
like Robert Bullard, Robert Brulle, and David Golblatt, he was the first one to use 
the idea of environmental risk as the central characteristic to create an analytical 
framework of the late 20th century and early 21st century society, replacing other 
vastly used concepts like ―production‖ and ―consumption.‖  
Beck‘s work also provided a justification for community participation as he 
wrote that self-governance and community-based decision making would be the 
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best way to deal with the sheer amount of risks produced in the late 20 th and 
early 21st century society. Beck‘s theory focused on the transformation of the 
production society created by Modernity after the industrial revolutions into a 
―risk‖ society because of the consequences of large-scale production finally 
accumulated to a point in which the generated risks could not be ignored or 
hidden any longer. The main problem, according to Beck, is that the 
governmental apparatuses are insufficient to regulate, oversee, investigate, and 
enforce the enormous amount of risks generated by the production society. In 
consequence, citizens needed to get organized and empowered to do what the 
State could not.133  
For some environmental justice and environmental sociology scholars, the 
births of the anti-toxic and the Environmental Justice Movements, as well as the 
resurgence of a reconfigured environmental movement in the second half of the 
20th century, are reflections and evidence of what Beck described. In chapter 4 
and 5 of this dissertation, EPCRA‘s history seems to exemplify what Anthony 
Giddens called ―reflexive society.‖134 As society is forced to deal with the 
consequences of the ―industrial society,‖ it creates new institutions to oversee the 
workings of the failing governmental institutions. For Beck, these new institutions 
are grassroots groups, citizens‘ organizations, and communities‘ associations.135 
As such, Beck‘s analysis of society fits well with the intent of 
environmental and environmental justice groups. These, in turn, will constitute 
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the main source of pressure on governmental agencies and private corporations 
to diminish the indiscriminate use and release of toxic and hazardous substances 
into the environment as shown both in his chapter and in chapter 4.  After a 
series of accidents and the discovery that even common industrial practices 
might have been contaminating entire communities, common citizens started to 
organize against corporate practice.136 However, the first step—and what 
became a seminal characteristic of theses movements—was to find out what 
kind of materials industrial facilities were using and releasing into the 
environment and what kind of risk they represented. These movements claimed, 
above all, that communities had a right to know what chemicals and materials 
were being released into their water, air, and soil.137 
On the theoretical side, the struggle for the right to know also found a 
home in two approaches to communication: environmental communication and 
risk communication. Historically, environmental communication began evolving 
from nature writing and later from the needs of the conservation and 
environmental movements to understand the role of media and corporate 
messages and to create their own. Academically, the field of environmental 
communication as a legitimate academic field started with Christine Oravec‘s 
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work on John Muir‘s rhetoric,138 although some other sociological and literary 
approaches to environmental writing and communication practice have been tried 
before.139  
Although the practice of risk communication can be traced to ancient 
times, the study of risk communication as an academic field, especially on 
environmental issues as pertained to the topic of this dissertation, came with the 
necessity of corporations to prepare for the impact of environmental disasters 
caused by their industrial plants. Although risk communication encompasses an 
extremely large field of research, as does environmental communication, this 
research will focus on the writings and understandings that are more directly 
related to the study of environmental risks involving toxic and hazardous 
materials and community empowerment and participation.  
The risk society 
Humans differ from brute action, too, in its influence upon the 
material world, because i t is not controlled by natural 
compensations and balances. Natural arrangements, once 
disturbed by man, are not restored unti l he retires from the field, 
and leaves free scope to spontaneous recuperative energies; the 
wounds he inflicts upon the material creation are not healed unti l he 
withdraws the arm that gave the blow. 
George Perkins Marsh140 
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In the sociological tradition, the idea of risk as the center of human society 
(as opposed to production or consumption, for example) comes mostly after 
Beck‘s work about a change of societal structures, evolving from the notion of 
industrial society to risk society. In 1986 Beck published Risikogesellschaft - Auf 
dem Weg in eine andere Moderne, translated to English six years later as Risk 
Society. In it, Beck141 portrayed a constantly changing world in its process of 
modernization and free of the traditional gridlocks of the industrial society. Beck‘s 
thesis was that society was ―witnessing not the end but the beginning of 
modernity – that is, of modernity beyond its classical industrial design.‖142 For 
Beck, that new stage of modernity will be what Beck called reflexive 
modernization, one of his central theories: ―The argument is that, while in 
classical industrial society the ―logic‖ of wealth production dominates the ―logic‖ 
of risk production, in the risk society this relationship is reversed.‖143 
Beck contended that the risks and consequences of modernization were 
―irreversible threats to the li fe of plants, animals, and human beings.‖144 Although 
many other authors, like Rachel Carson145 for example, identified environmental 
problems as a serious threat to society, Beck‘s work created a new lens for the 
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social sciences to study the concept of environmental risk as the central focus of 
analysis, replacing the role of social institutions. Beck also proposed that, with 
the failure of social institutions to deal with the broad concept of risk, society 
would need to turn more and more to civic participation and self-governance in all 
stages of government and society. For Beck, only through the inclusion of the 
public in the decision-making process would governments be able to prevent and 
ameliorate environmental problems. He also defended the concept that well-
informed local communities would be more able to monitor and react to local 
risks.146    
For David Goldblatt147 the distinguishing feature of Beck‘s work was 
to place the origins and consequences of environmental 
degradation right at the heart of a theory of modern society, rather 
than seeing it as a peripheral element or theoretical afterthought. 
Beck‘s sociology and the societies it describes are dominated by 
the existence of environmental threats and the ways we understand 
and respond to them.148 
 
Golblatt149 wrote that the ideas of risks and hazards in Beck‘s work were 
most closely examined in the equation with environmental degradation and, citing 
Anthony Giddens, differentiated risk from danger explaining that what transforms 
dangers and hazards into risks is that they are known, predictable and whose 
likelihood that can be calculated.  
To be in danger is one thing. To know that one is in danger is quite 
another. To know that one is in danger and to feel essentially 
powerless to alter the course of events which generate that danger 
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is another again. Alongside the shift from danger to risk, 
contemporary environmental problems possess further distinctive 
characteristics which elicit and demand very particular patterns of 
political and psychological response. These demands and 
responses are of such magnitude that their emergence can be said 
to herald the emergence of a distinctive form of modernity.150 
 
In that way, Beck presented three arguments explaining different features 
of modern environmental risks. First, differently from the past, contemporary 
hazards are not limited in their effects by spatial or social limitations. The second 
argument describes the catastrophic and even total annihilating effects of large-
scale nuclear and chemical accidents and of the genetic manipulation of the 
planet‘s fauna and flora. Finally, the last argument explained that the point of 
impact of modern environmental risks ―is not obviously tied to their point of origin 
and that their transmission and movements are often invisible and untrackable to  
everyday perception.‖151 
According to Beck, the critique of the scientific development in a reflexive 
examination belongs in the public sphere,152 putting the lay public and the 
scientists at the same level of importance in the political process.153 
Environmental sociologist Eugene A. Rosa154 wrote that Anthony 
Giddens‘s and Ulrich Beck‘s theories on modernization and risk society should 
be considered ―theories of society and environment‖ because of the present 
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concern for hazards in the contemporary world and over the vulnerability of the 
environment. For Rosa, risk is a ―valuable analytic lens for evaluating past and 
future impacts of humans on the environment.‖155  
The Environmental Justice Movement and the road to EPCRA 
Then a strange blight crept over the area and everything began to 
change. Some evil spell had settled on the community: mysterious 
maladies swept the flocks of chickens; the cattle and sheep 
sickened and died. Everywhere was a shadow of death. The 
farmers spoke of much illness among their families. In the town the 
doctors had become more and more puzzled by new kinds of 
sickness appearing among their patients. There had been several 
sudden and unexplained deaths, not only among adults but even 
among children, who would be stricken suddenly while at play and 
die within hours. 
Rachel Carson156 
 
 
The origins of the U. S. environmental movement as a political action can 
be tracked back to September 30, 1847, when U.S. Congressman George 
Perkins Marsh stood up before the Agricultural Society of Rutland County, 
Vermont to deliver a speech that would become seminal for the Conservation 
Movement on the necessity of protecting American wildlife and vegetation.157  
Such ideas gained strength prior to World War I with the formation of John 
Muir‘s Sierra Club and the National Audubon Society, but primarily with the 
adoption of conservation ideals by the General Federation of Women‘s Clubs, 
which worked as the main engine of information dissemination. The GFWC 
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counted with more than one million members in 1900 and created a 
communication network never seen before at that time. A good part of Muir‘s 
success, for example, depended on the efficiency of the GFWC in passing along 
sensitive information and exerting influence in key political figures.158  
Jack E. Davis, in an article about Marjory Stoneman Douglas, a most 
influential woman environmentalist, wrote: 
Many women's organizations, particularly the more influential white, 
middle- to upper-class groups, integrated social concerns—child 
welfare, school reform, and pure-food regulations—with 
conservation agendas. The national General Federation of 
Women's Clubs (GFWC) maintained a conservation department, 
and among its lobbying accomplishments were state and national 
laws to protect forests, waters, and wildlife. Gifford Pinchot, whose 
mother chaired the conservation committee of the Daughters of 
American Revolution, observed in 1910 that "few people realize 
what women have already done for conservation." 159 
 
The Conservation Movement became one of the first movements to 
present characteristics that would only appear in the second half of the 20th 
century as it linked environmental issues to the fight for civil rights, particularly 
the inclusion of women and African-descendents into the public life. However, 
first economic problems of the Great Depression of 1929, and then the all-out 
defense efforts of World War II submerged the Conservation Movement, with 
wartime concerns becoming more important than conservation, or for that matter, 
civil rights, social welfare, and public health.  
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Despite the fact that by 1958 every American state had discovered cases 
of toxic contamination of ground water,160 it was only in 1962, with Rachel 
Carson‘s book Silent Spring, that environment and public health were stirred 
together once again. Carson‘s book resuscitated the  discussion about 
environmental degradation by showing how human actions can have a ―domino 
effect‖ on nature. Carson showed how the use of DDT and other chemicals 
caused the contamination of U.S. waters. The poison was then absorbed by 
plankton and spread upward and with increasing concentration through the food 
chain back to human consumption causing a variety of deadly diseases.161  Silent 
Spring was the seed for the grassroots effort that later included the Anti-toxic 
Movement, one of the most effective sides of the new and reconfigured 
environmental movement.162 
The Anti-toxic Movement helped increase the public outcry for regulations 
on the use of toxic and hazardous materials by industry and became instrumental 
(although not alone) in the creation of a series of laws and regulations—among 
them the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Toxic Substance Control 
Act, the Clean Air Act, and the National Environmental Policy Act163—and even 
the birth of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970.164 In the end of 
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the 1970s and early 1980s, a series of events put together environmental 
concerns, civi l rights and social justice concepts that became known simply as 
environmental justice.165  
Initially, what is known now as the Environmental Justice Movement was 
actually a myriad of different smaller movements, like the Anti-toxic Movement, a 
few Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) actions, and the People of Color 
Environmental Movement. Robert D. Bullard and Glenn S. Johnson referred to a 
visit by the reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. to Memphis in 1968 ―on an 
environmental and economic justice mission for the striking Black garbage 
workers,‖ who were demanding equal pay and better working conditions as a first 
step for the Environmental Justice Movement.166 
The Environmental Justice Movement began to emerge from geographic 
areas that were primarily populated by people of color or lower economic status 
that had been affected by air, water, and soil pollution.167 The Environmental 
Justice Movement became an umbrella term to unify hundreds of different local 
struggles against low environmental standards from companies and local 
governments. These sometimes organized groups aimed to force corporations 
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and governments to clean up and compensate local communities for the spill of 
toxic chemicals in the soil, water, and air, and to impede the allocation of high-
risk industrial plants in ethnic or poor neighborhoods among other things. Luke 
Cole and Sheila Foster wrote about the difficulties of pinpointing a specific origin 
for the movement:  
Pointing to a particular date or event that launched the 
Environmental Justice Movement is impossible, as the movement 
grew organically out of dozens, even hundreds, of local struggles 
and events and out of a variety of other social movements. 
Nevertheless, certain incidents loom large in the history of the 
movement as galvanizing events.168 
 
Sherry Cable and Charles Cable169 identified three social forces in the 
1980s that promoted the perception of race and class injustice among the 
working class. First, the disasters of Love Canal and Three Mile Island 
exemplified the failure of governmental institutions by exposing how those 
institutions served class interests. The second was the environmental 
deregulation of the Reagan Administration. The third was the trickle-down 
environmental grievances revealed through the discoveries of more 
contaminated communities.170  
The community of Love Canal, New York, was poisoned by 248 separate 
chemicals at the end of the 1970s, including 130 pounds of dioxin, one of the 
most toxic substances known to science according to an EPA/National Research 
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Council Report.171 ―Quite simply, Love Canal is one of the most appalling 
environmental tragedies in American history,‖ wrote Eckardt C. Beck, 
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency during the Love Canal 
crisis for the EPA Journal at the time. 
But this is not really where the story ends. Quite the contrary.  
We suspect that there are hundreds of such chemical dumpsites 
across this Nation.  
Unlike Love Canal, few are situated so close to human settlements. 
But without a doubt, many of these old dumpsites are time bombs 
with burning fuses -- their contents slowly leaching out. And the 
next victim could be a water supply, or a sensitive wetland. 
The presence of various types of toxic substances in our 
environment has become increasingly widespread -- a fact that 
President Carter has called "one of the grimmest discoveries of the 
modern era." 
Chemical sales in the United States now exceed a mind-boggling 
$112 billion per year, with as many as 70,000 chemical substances 
in commerce. Love Canal can now be added to a growing list of 
environmental disasters involving toxics, ranging from industrial 
workers stricken by nervous disorders and cancers to the discovery 
of toxic materials in the milk of nursing mothers. 172 
 
Love Canal was one of the most reported cases of toxic disaster in the 
U.S., but was small in numbers of victims when compared to previous disasters 
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like the Donora Smog in Monongahela River Valley in Pennsylvania in 1948173 or 
the Buffalo Creek Hollow disaster in 1972.174 However, because of the Love 
Canal Homeowner Association (LCHA) refusal to accept the condescending 
attitude from the authorities by hiring their own experts  to track down health 
problems associated with the toxic dumping, 800 people ended up being 
evacuated permanently from the area. The LCHA‘s battle became a media 
phenomenon and pressured the federal government to enact the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), or 
Superfund Law.175    
Bullard and Johnson identified a waste dispute in Houston, Texas, which 
resulted in the landmark lawsuit Bean vs. Southwestern Waste Management Inc. 
of 1979 as the precursor event of the fight against environmental racism.176 
Margaret Bean and other Houston residents sued Southwestern Waste 
Management to stop the creation of a landfill in an almost exclusively African-
American neighborhood. The company won the lawsuit as the plaintiffs failed to 
prove the company‘s intent to discriminate. However, a struggle against the 
construction of a hazardous waste landfill in Warren County, North Carolina in 
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1982 is considered the official birth of the Environmental Justice Movement, 
according to Eileen Maura McGurty, Robert D. Bullard and others.177 ―The 
protests marked the first time African Americans had mobilized a national broad-
based group to oppose what they defined as environmental racism,‖ Bullard 
wrote.178 Nevertheless, despite a six-week protest with the participation of nearly 
500 people, the landfill was constructed. For McGurty, the reason the protest in 
Warren County is still considered the birth of the Environmental Justice 
Movement despite older events was the presence of the four factors determined 
by Sidney Tarrow: cultural frames, social networks, disruptive action, and political 
opportunities.179 
In Warren County all of these requirements were met and the 
development of a new social movement was possible. First, 
environmental racism was the collective action frame with its 
unique diagnosis, attribution of blame, and proposed solutions. 
Second, informal associations, connected to the civil rights 
movement, had receded into daily life and were now ready to 
emerge with this new opportunity. Third, the disruptive action in 
Warren County followed closely the repertoire established by civil 
rights activism several decades earlier and was well known by 
participants, bystanders, and authorities. The organizers were also 
able to modify it slightly to create significant disorder. Lastly, 
political opportunities were ripe: Hazardous waste reforms created 
an atmosphere for extensive environmental reforms; changes in 
environmental legislation had enabled citizens to influence 
environmental decision making; shifts in African-American electoral 
politics also opened the field for action.180 
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As seen before, Cole and Foster explained the foundations for the 
Environmental Justice Movement as a mix of influences from the Civil Rights 
Movement, Anti-toxics Movement (now called the Environmental Health 
Movement), Native American struggles, the Labor Movement, traditional 
environmentalists, academics, and earlier environmental justice (against racism) 
activists.181  
The Environmental Justice Movement differs from the larger 
environmental movement that had been active in the United States since the late 
1800s.182 Changing the locus of the environmental struggle from the wilderness 
to populated areas, the Environmental Justice Movement worked from the 
grassroots level to include ―where people live, work, play, go to school, as well as 
how these things interact with the physical and natural worlds.‖183 The 
Environmental Justice Movement was born as a ―political response to the 
deterioration of the conditions of everyday life as society reinforces social 
inequalities‖ and has sought to ―redefine environmentalism as much more 
integrated with social needs of human populations.‖184 The Environmental Justice 
Movement was a loose alliance of grassroots efforts that emerged as a response 
to the environmental paradigm in place before the 1970s in order to challenge 
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perceived practices, policies, and conditions that are felt to be unfair, unjust, or 
outright illegal.185 
The efforts of all the movements and actions under the umbrella of the 
Environmental Justice Movement became the main source of political pressure 
that ended up in the creation of laws related to toxic substances, like CERCLA in 
1980, and, in 1986, the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act 
(EPCRA).186  
Relating environmental justice and environmental risk communication 
Beyond EPCRA and the right to know, the concept of environmental 
justice is also an important part of the environmental risk communication 
model.187 Among the most important issues in contemporary environmental and 
risk communication, environmental justice addresses perceived race and class 
inequities in the distribution of environmental risks. The Environmental Protection 
Agency defined environmental justice as  
the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people 
regardless of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to 
the development, implementation, and enforcement of 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. … It will be achieved 
when everyone enjoys the same degree of protection from 
environmental and health hazards and equal access to the 
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decision-making process to have a healthy environment in which to 
live, learn, and work.188 
 
Andy Gouldson189 examined the relationships between corporate social 
responsibility and environmental justice. Using data collected from 2003 to 2005 
on oil refineries in the European Union and the United States, the study 
concentrated on three basic areas: 1) a qualitative evaluation of corporate social 
responsibility policies of nine petroleum-based companies; 2) a quantitative 
report on site-level practices of environmental performance of refineries in the 
European Union and the United States; and 3) a quantitative description of 
variances in environmental performance of refineries in relation to the principles 
of environmental justice.  
The findings in the first area showed that the three largest companies had 
better corporate social responsibility policies than did the smaller firms in the 
survey. More importantly, at the local level, there were correlations between 
refineries with higher levels of emissions and refineries in lower levels of income, 
employment, and population density. Gouldson‘s correlation did not show a 
historical causality; Gouldson could not prove or disprove that refineries were 
being placed in certain areas because they were lower income areas. Over and 
over, scientific reports190 showed that there is both a correlation between the 
                                                 
188
 EPA, 2007, introduction, § 1.  
189
 Gouldson. Andy. “Do Firms Adopt Lower Standards in Poorer Areas? Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Environmental Justice in the EU and the US,” Area, 38 (2006): 402-412. 
190
 Centner, Terence J., Kriesel, Warren, & Keeler, Andrew G. 1996. “Environmental Justice and Toxic 
Releases: Establishing Evidence of Discriminatory Effect Based on Race and Not Income ,”  Wisconsin 
Environmental Law Journal 3, 119-158; Chakraborty, Jayajit, & Armstrong, Marc P. 2001. “Assessing the 
Impact of Airborne Toxic Releases on Populations with Special Needs ,” Professional Geographer 53, no. 
 75 
allocation of pollutant facilities in ethnic and/or lower-income areas and the 
development of ethnic and/or lower-income neighborhoods around such facilities 
due to lower property prices. 
Overall, organized concern about environmental justice not only led to the 
enactment of EPCRA, as will be demonstrated on chapter 4, it is also a 
fundamental concept in the discussion about community right to know and 
effective and informed risk decisions Environmental justice is, in itself, an 
expected outcome of the law.191 
 
Environmental and risk communication 
Community residents who live near or work at manufacturing facilities that 
produce potentially hazardous and toxic materials  are sensitive to the fairness 
and equity of risk distribution and to the resulting environmental and aesthetic 
implications of activities of such facilities.192 The perception of risk or fair 
allocation of risk is among the numerous motivators people use when deciding 
whether a problem exists and deserves their attention. Once in the face of a risk 
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situation, people may opt to make personal responses or to collaboratively seek 
collective solutions by engaging in public policy struggles.193 This carries two 
core concerns of both environmental and risk communication: the existence of 
real risk or actual problem and the public perception about them, which may 
empower or discourage communities to act.  Below the concepts and 
applications of environmental communication and risk communication will be 
explored under the framework provided by the concepts of risk society and 
environmental justice. 
Environmental communication 
Environmental communication encompasses various different practical 
and theoretical instances and approaches. It can relate to the work of activists 
and advocates, regulators, journalists, community organizations, and 
corporations. For each practice, environmental communication may have 
different specific purposes, like education, persuasion, information, regulation, 
etc. Moreover, environmental communication can be studied from a variety of 
perspectives, such as mass communications, rhetoric, advocacy campaigns and 
lobbying, marketing, advertising, popular culture, literature, social movements, 
interpersonal communication, organizational communication, etc.194 
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Environmental communication is a field within the communication 
discipline, as well as a metafield that cuts across disciplines. 
Research and theory within the field is united by the topical focus 
on communication and human relations with the environment. 
Scholars who study environmental communication are particularly 
concerned with the ways people communicate about the natural 
world because they believe that such communication has far 
reaching effects at a time of largely human-caused environmental 
crises.195 
 
The challenge to define environmental communication is certainly as 
complex as the diversity of topics, objectives, and approaches used in the field. 
Robert Cox196  presented an ―informal‖ and a formal definition for the field. 
Informally, Cox saw environmental communication as a 
study of the ways in which we communicate about the environment, 
the effects of this communication on our perceptions of both the 
environment and ourselves, and therefore on our relationship with 
the natural world.197 
 
In his formal definition, Cox approached the subject from both symbolic-
interactionist and social-constructivist perspectives and pointed out two main 
distinct functions of environmental communication: one based on practice and 
the other as formative of people‘s perception and knowledge: 
I use environmental communication to mean the pragmatic and 
constitutive vehicle for our understanding of the environment as 
well as our relationships to the natural world; it is the symbolic 
medium that we use in constructing environmental problems and 
negotiating society‘s different responses to them.198 
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In its pragmatic function, environmental communication ―educates, alerts, 
persuades, mobilizes, and helps us to solve environmental problems.‖199 In its 
constitutive function, Cox wrote, environmental communication helps to build 
shared meanings and perceptions about environmental problems. The way we 
communicate may help people see a given situation as a threat or a solution; as 
a problem or as something desirable.200 
Manfred Oepen, looking from a strategic/persuasion viewpoint, wrote that 
environmental communication is the ―planned and strategic use of 
communication processes and media products to support effective policy-
making, public participation and project implementation geared towards 
environmental sustainability.‖ 201 According to Oepen, influencing the 
policymaking process is a part of environmental communication as much as it is 
to guarantee the implementation of projects that envision the protection of the 
natural environment through public participation. 
 Oepen saw the role of environmental communication as an educative and 
engaging social interaction process that enables people to ―understand key 
environmental factors and their interdependencies, and to act upon related 
problems in a competent way.‖202 Hence, environmental communication is not 
only – not even mainly – a tool for disseminating information, but a process that 
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aims at producing ―a shared vision of a sustainable future and at capacity-
building in social groups to so lve or prevent environmental problems.‖203  
Oepen‘s understanding obviously excluded the role of journalism and 
lobbying groups that are against environmental regulation. On the other hand, 
David Sachsman, James Simon and JoAnn Valenti204 presented the results of a 
survey of 354 environmental reporters in four different regions of the U.S. 
showing that almost all of the journalists (352) understood that environmental 
reporters must be as objective as any other journalists. All of them defended that 
environmental reporters should be fair to corporations and environmental groups 
in the same way, and 69.5% believe that environmental journalists should not 
work with community leaders to solve environmental problems. 
Based on Sachsman‘s findings, Robert Wyss postulated that good 
environmental journalists still have to follow the six tenets of journalistic work: 
accuracy, thoroughness, balance, fairness, transparency, and passion.205  
Others believed that environmental journalism, like journalism in general, 
may be an ―engaged‖ practice, because the role of the journalist is always to 
defend the public interest under democratic concepts. In the first issue of 
Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, Robert Cox 
asked if environmental communication could be described as a ―crisis discipline,‖ 
like conservation biology. His argument was that some disciplines are created 
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with the sole intent of solving specific problems (or crises).206 Medicine, for 
example, has the purpose of studying the human body with the intent to cure and 
prevent ailments and promote health, like conservation biology has the purpose 
to find ways to protect biodiversity and ecosystems.  
Environmental communication encompasses much more than its crisis 
facet, though. Historically, environmental communication started as nature 
writing, aesthetic art, and scientific descriptions about the natural world with no 
intent to stop or prevent a specific problem. Many pictures and depictions of 
animals, plants, and landscapes had, and sti ll have, the sole purpose of 
entertainment or aesthetic pleasure, not a politically engaged one.207 
The environment—and therefore the communication about the 
environment and environmental issues—surpasses most physical and 
academics barriers. The concept of ―environment‖ is, in fact, larger than the 
concepts of ―politics,‖ ―economics,‖ and ―society,‖ the traditional lenses through 
which most social scientists and humanists see the world. Brazilian journalist and 
professor André Trigueiro wrote that it would be much more accurate to describe 
the environmental variable as ―systemic.‖ As researchers and practitioners define 
certain facts for their sociological, political, economic, cultural, psychological, 
anthropological (etc.) aspects and implications, they can also be understood for 
their environmental aspects and implications. 208  
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The systemic view in environmental issues draws on Deep Ecology‘s 
philosophical understanding that everything in the universe is interrelated and 
that we need to ask deeper questions if we are to understand our role within the 
natural environment.209 Therefore, in Trigueiro‘s understanding, more than just a 
beat to be covered in the media, an environmental systemic view would add to 
the other perspectives (social, political, economic, etc.), reconnecting human 
society to nature and softening our anthropocentric views. This view was also 
championed by the EPA's second Administrator and former President of the 
World Wildlife Fund, U.S., Russell E. Train, and by William Shannon, former U.S. 
ambassador to Ireland and former New York Times correspondent: 
"environment" is not simply another problem to be solved or crisis 
to be surmounted. … it is the overall and underlying context within 
which we must weigh and deal with the various economic, energy, 
and other crises and problems that confront us.210 
 
This concept adds a reconstructive aspect to the constitutive function in 
Cox‘s formal definition of environmental communication.211 Environmental 
communication is then a prism or a lens through which we can understand the 
universe around us. Such view of environmental communication also coincides 
with that of James G. Cantrill and Christine Oravec, two of the first scholars to 
define the field of environmental communication:212 ―The way we communicate 
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with one another about the environment powerfully affects how we perceive both 
it and ourselves and, therefore, how we define our relationship with the natural 
world.‖213 
Cox also advocated that one of the essential roles of environmental 
communication is to function as an educational tool to help public audiences and 
policymakers to understand the nature of environmental contexts.214 Cox argued 
that ―individuals and communities have a stronger chance to safeguard the 
environmental health and quality of their local environments if they understand 
some of the dynamics of and opportunities for communication about their 
concerns.‖215 A well-informed public is fundamental for good governance and 
environmental communication is the right tool for the job, Cox wrote, for ―[i]t 
educates, alerts, persuades, mobilizes, and helps us to solve environmental 
problems.‖216 It also ―helps to compose representations of nature and 
environmental problems as subjects for our understanding.‖217  
Following a complementary approach, Corbett defined environmental 
communication as a complex and multi-layered phenomenon. For her, not only 
the information that is made available but also the way in which that information 
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is made available – the communication process – defines how people and 
communities see their role in society and the role of society itself.218 
For this study, it is important to understand a critical intersection between 
environmental communication and the role played by environmental risks in the 
society of the late 20th century and early 21st century. Cox, for example, credited 
the importance of risk communication to the way in which it looks at the 
effectiveness of communication strategies for conveying information about health 
and environmental risks, the impact of cultural understanding of risk on the 
public‘s judgment of the acceptability of a risk, and the ways to develop more 
democratic methods to involve affected communities in evaluating risk.219 
Consequently, the role of risk communication about environmental issues is as 
important as the role of environmental communication about risks in 
understanding how environmental risks affect society‘s perceptions and 
behaviors, especially in how it can drive the policymaking process. 
Risk communication 
According to the National Research Council (NRC), risk communication is 
a means to open, responsible, informed, reasonable, scientific and value-laden 
discussion of risks associated with personal health and safety practices involved 
in living and working in close proximity to harmful activities and toxic 
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substances220 —a concept that was early adopted by EPA.221 This view of risk 
communication typically involves large organizations whose activities can pose a 
risk to members of a community. According to Michael J. Palenchar, ―Risk 
communication provides the opportunity to understand and appreciate 
stakeholders‘ concerns related to risks generated by organizations, engage in 
dialogue to address differences and concerns, and carry out appropriate actions 
that can reduce perceived risks.‖222  
Summarizing a variety of interpretive approaches to risk, Catherine 
Althaus compared economic perspectives and models that distinguish risk from 
uncertainty in which risk is a structured application of knowledge to uncertainties. 
According to Althaus, anthropologists understand risk as a cultural phenomenon; 
sociologists a societal phenomenon; economists a decisional phenomenon 
related to securing wealth; legal researchers as a judicable phenomenon; 
psychologists as a behavioral and/or cognitive phenomenon; linguists as a 
concept; historians as material for narrations about past resource uses, and so 
forth.223 
Having written extensively on the history of modern risk communication, 
William Leiss described different eras of the field. According to Leiss, the risk 
communication started as a source-oriented approach based on the locale where 
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risks are present. It then evolved to its present approach of communication 
based on shared social relations, focusing on experiences in common and public 
relations practices.224 Baruch Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, S tephen 
Read, and Barbara Combs found that risk ratings by laypersons, unlike those of 
experts, are not influenced solely by fatality estimates and other statistical 
measurements.225 Differences in judgments among laypersons were affected by 
numerous qualitative factors such as voluntariness, immediacy of effect, personal 
knowledge about risk, available scientific knowledge about risk, level of control 
over risk, newness, reach (chronic-catastrophic), fear level (common-dread), and 
severity of consequences. Palenchar has written: 
As such, there is no single psychology or sociology of risks . . . 
Risks are not necessarily selected and perceived due to their 
scientific merit or personal benefit, but out of a combination of 
social and cultural factors, denotative and connotative reasons.226 
 
Regina Lundgren and Andrea McMakin, for example, listed nothing less 
than 12 approaches to the study of risk communication: communication process, 
the NRC‘s approach, mental models, crisis communication, convergence 
communication, three-challenge, social constructionist, hazard plus outrage, 
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mental noise, social network contagion, social amplification of risk, and social 
trust.227 
In this study, the focus will be Susan Haden‘s look into the connections 
between risk communication and the right to know. Hadden228 wrote that the role 
of risk communication, very much like environmental communication, is to 
function as a learning system that provides citizens with an understanding of 
risks, hazards, and health issues, but that it also works to help people use this 
knowledge in the political arena, improving public regulation and corporate 
practices. ―If citizens are to take action based on information, they must 
understand it,‖229 she wrote. 
Hadden developed a four-level concept of right to know applied to 
environmental risks involving toxic and hazardous chemicals. The ―basic‖ level 
has the purpose of ensuring that citizens can find information about chemicals 
and holds the government accountable for ensuring that data are created and 
available.  
The ―risk reduction‖ level aims to reduce risks from chemicals, ―preferably 
through voluntary industry action but also by government if necessary.‖230 In this 
case, regulators should use information to create new standards or enforce 
existing ones if industry fails to police itself.  
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The ―better decision-making‖ level allows citizens to participate in the 
decision-making process about the appropriate levels of hazardous materials in 
their communities. The role of government in this level is to provide citizens not 
only with analyzed data, but also with methods for manipulating and interpreting 
data.  
Finally, the ―alter balance of power‖ level empowers citizens to participate 
in the decision-making process in the same or higher standing than government 
and industry. The role of government in this level is to provide citizens with all the 
information and tools as the other levels plus the means to participate. 
Hadden‘s understanding of right to know and risk communication seems 
to follow the pre-concept of a right to know developed by Thomas Jefferson as 
not only a right to obtain information about government (and industry) actions, 
but also to be educated about the purposes and functions of government (and 
industry). Hadden took a step further by suggesting an actual ―means‖ to include 
citizens in the decision-making process beyond the educative component. 
According to Hadden, risk communication is a democratic tool for participatory 
citizenship where the right to know is also the right to take part in the process.231 
Hadden‘s claim that community right to know reaches beyond the letter of the law 
through the use of communication practices and techniques. Thus, the role 
played by environmental risk communication is fundamental to understand the 
development of the right to know in EPCRA as a different approach to policy that 
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goes beyond the previous ―command -and-control‖ and ―market-based‖ 
approaches. 
As seen in the work of Beck232 and Cox,233 environmental risks are at the 
core of our understanding of society today. Robert L. Heath, Michael J. 
Palenchar, Stephanie Protheau, and Tatjana M. Hocke reinforced the link 
between environmental and risk communication: 
The role of environmental and risk communication, and the 
essence of its analysis and pedagogy, should be to increase the 
quality of enlightened decision-making so that societies can be 
more fully functional in their identification, assessment, and 
management of risks. This requires the shaping and application of 
a functional set of shared principles that have scientific validation 
and reflect the cultural dimensions of a risk society. It is becoming 
increasingly clear that the main product of environmental and risk 
communication is not informed understanding as such, but the 
quality of the social relationship it supports, becoming a tool for 
communicating values and identities as much as being about 
awareness, attitudes, and behaviors related to the risk itself.234 
 
Therefore, environmental and risk communication are not just ways to 
inform the public about environmental risks, but processes of using information to 
form identities, perceptions, and behaviors that will diminish—and  even 
completely change—the practices that produce those environmental risks. 
Environmental and risk communication are educational and culture-forming 
processes much in line with the understanding of the role of informed and 
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educated citizenry of some of the American Founding Fathers and, later on, the 
right to know as proposed by Susan Hadden.235  
In assessing Hadden‘s postulate, Palenchar concluded that ―strategic risk 
communication highlights the importance of a dialogic, relationship-building 
approach to address the concerns and perceptions of community residents and 
employees, and one of the keys to success is supposed to be community-right-
to-know initiatives.‖236 As a result of this understanding, the relationship between 
those who produce risk and those who will suffer the consequences of the 
actualization of those risks cannot be one of controller and controlled. Instead of 
having one side controlling all the information about the risky practice, the 
information generated by scientists should be shared with the neighboring 
communities, so they can help each other to avoid harm, or, at least, to minimize 
damages in the moment of crisis. 
Heath and Palenchar defended the interrelation of community-relations 
with risk communication.237 In accordance with Hadden‘s defense of community 
right to know238 and other authors in environmental law,239 they found in their 
longitudinal study that educating and including the community in risk and crisis 
planning generates higher awareness and more trust in companies‘ personnel 
and government officials in the community.  
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Following the right-to-know principle in public policy, environmental risk 
communication has been used to inform, educate, and empower communities 
facing environmental risks and injustices. Environmental risk communication can 
become a vehicle for influencing and even controlling the policymaking process. 
Organized citizens can gain media visibility and pressure politicians. 
Corporations can educate the public about the reality of the risks their plants 
pose and/or lobby governments to pass laws that are more favorable for their 
businesses. As the next chapters demonstrate, the application of such concepts 
under EPCRA has not only affected the development of EPCRA, but transformed 
it into a new way to approach public policy.   
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CHAPTER 4: THE EMERGENCY PLANNING AND COMMUNITY RIGHT TO 
KNOW ACT OF 1986—THE RIGHT TO KNOW AS APPROACH TO PUBLIC 
POLICY 
The statute was enacted based upon the fundamental principle that 
an informed citizenry is essential to the democratic process and 
that the more the American people know about their government 
the better they will be governed. Openness in government is 
essential to accountability and the Act has become an integral part 
of the process. 
Bill Clinton240 
 
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act of 1986241 is 
such a different approach to law and policy that it has been heralded both as the 
―most successful piece of environmental legislation‖ and a ―complete waste of 
time‖ by different people and, sometimes, by the same analysts. June C. 
Bolstridge, for example, mentioned that EPCRA has been considered ―a model of 
information development and access in environmental regulatory circles,‖ and 
that ―legislation similar to EPCRA is being evaluated by several other nations.242 
At the same time, Bolstridge observed that ―the law has been criticized for many 
reasons.‖243 
In this chapter, EPCRA will be described in a narrative based on the 
official transcripts of legislative sections, newspapers‘ stories,244 and a variety of 
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complementary documents245 and secondary sources. Although a critical 
analysis of the events will be part of this chapter, a more in-depth analysis of the 
meanings and results of EPCRA‘s history, especially about the opportunities to 
communication scholars and practitioners, will be presented on chapter 5. This 
chapter picks up where the previous chapter left off on the history of the 
Environmental Justice Movement as being a successful source of pressure in 
implementing a few anti-toxic laws. 
Unlike previous chapters, chapter 4 will be punctuated by quotes that 
reflect the events and context of a specific period followed by the narration of the 
events of that period. That was done not only to improve the historical narrative 
and make it more interesting, but to also delineate and systematize the general 
cultural, social, and political contexts of different moments of EPCRA‘s history.  
“What do you expect? EPA lobbied against RCRA in the first place, and it 
has no intention of ever aggressively enforcing it.” 246 
 
Since 1976, when Gerald Ford signed the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (RCRA)—the first major piece of legislation that addressed the 
specific problem of toxic waste management—and throughout Jimmy Carter‘s 
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presidency, there were many attempts to create a law that successfully controlled 
the massive amount of toxic and hazardous materials being released into the 
environment.247 However, as Marc Mowrey and Tim Redmond‘s investigation of 
the NIMBY movement showed, the laws were not necessarily the problem, but 
the 9-year-old EPA.  
 In 1979, the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations 
found that three years after the passage of the law, the EPA still 
hadn‘t adopted a single RCRA regulation. Some 260 million pounds 
of life-threatening chemicals were still being dumped every day, 
without federal oversight. 248 
 
Another problem EPA was facing at the time was the scientific uncertainty 
about the effects of hundreds of chemicals. That included a large number of new 
synthetics created by the fast evolving industry. Douglas M. Costle, EPA 
administrator during the Carter Era, explained the situation in his oral history 
interview for EPA with an example: 
Steve Gage and his R&D people wanted to bui ld an activated 
carbon filtration plant at our Cincinnati laboratory, which was EPA's 
major drinking water lab. They needed $40 million. That was a lot of 
money in those days. When I asked why, they said, "We've been 
sampling drinking water, using newer technologies of gas 
chromatography and mass spectrometry. We can detect things now 
that we couldn't a while back. We have found over 700 synthetic 
organic chemicals in finished drinking water, of which eleven are 
either known or suspected carcinogens, based on animal studies. 
Well over 20 or 30 percent of these chemicals are relatively new 
inventions." That is, they were substances that hadn't existed  20 
years earlier but were just showing up now in sediments. I said, 
"Are you telling me that water is not safe to drink?" They said, "No. 
We don't know that. It wi ll take several thousand mice, a team of 
technicians, and several years to analyze, chemical-by-chemical, 
and even then we don't have the methodology to determine what 
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effects two or more of these chemicals interacting might produce, 
as opposed to each acting individually. By the same token, we are 
not telling you that the water is safe to drink. What we're telling you 
is that we don't know, and there is no scientific silver bullet that is 
going to give us the answer. So we want to build this laboratory to 
see how effectively it can strip these chemicals out of this water."249  
 
Despite EPA‘s inefficiency in addressing toxic pollution issues, Carter‘s 
administration‘s still had a last shot in trying to get both EPA and the industry to 
control the release of toxic and hazardous substances into the environment. A 
piece of legislation written by Jim J. Florio, a Representative from New Jersey250 
with experience in both environmental and commerce issues, was described by 
some in the Anti-toxic Movement as its last hope to get comprehensive 
legislation against toxic waste dumping passed before the administration of 
President Ronald Reagan took power. Differently from Carter‘s, Reagan‘s 
administration was seen in the movement as sided with the chemical industry 
and other anti-environmental groups.251  
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“This Senate has made the judgement that property is more significant 
than human beings”252 
 
Florio‘s law, named Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), started out with a dispositive that, 
besides being more aggressive and specific than RCRA and TSCA, put the 
burden of paying for control and cleanup of toxic spills on industry and not on 
government. The law was seen as revolutionary and a welcome solution for the 
toxic spill problem by some anti-toxic activists, but also as an excessive burden 
by industry representatives. The most important role CERCLA would play would 
be to hold industry accountable for the costs of cleaning up the sites of past 
violations of RCRA and TSCA and to improve on those laws by adding liability 
provisions that allowed government to criminally prosecute and to fine non-
compliant corporations. Retrospectively looking into CERCLA‘s role among anti-
toxic legislation, Lois J. Schiffer former Assistant Attorney General for the 
Environment and Natural Resources Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, 
said: 
CERCLA‘s liability provisions have caused a virtual revolution in 
industry‘s approach to hazardous waste, providing a strong 
incentive for pollution prevention and waste minimization efforts 
that have reduced dramatically the amount of hazardous waste that 
is generated in this country.253    
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However, Congress passed CERCLA stripped clean from its liability 
clauses following the directions from the Chemical Manufacturers Association‘s 
lobby. Consequently, CERCLA had most of its power taken away during its 
enactment in 1980 and almost became moot, provoking Senator George J. 
Mitchell‘s ire: ―[N]one of us should delude ourselves or the people of this country 
that we have done anything more dishonorable,‖ Mitchell said.254 
With the Reagan Administration in power and especially with Anne 
Gorsuch, a radical anti-regulation legislator from Colorado with ties to oil, gas, 
mining, and timber company lobbies at the head of EPA, and the Anti-toxic 
Movement‘s hopes dwindled: 
Lois Gibbs had a lot of problems with EPA—as far as she could tell, 
it wasn‘t doing its job. Gorsuch had problems, too: she thought the 
agency was doing far too much. President Reagan had vowed that 
―there are tens of thousands of … regulations I would like to see 
eliminated‖—and the way Gorsuch saw it, there was no better place 
to start than the EPA.255 
  
Gorsuch was later accused among of other things of refusing to provide 
information to the Congressional Public Works Committee investigating 
Superfund enforcement, lifting the Carter administration‘s ban on the disposal of 
a number of liquid chemicals in hazardous-waste landfills, the severe cuts on 
EPA‘s enforcement staff, placing Rita Lavelle—a former public relations for 
Aerojet-General Corporation, a chemical manufacturer and third worst polluter in 
California—in charge of the Superfund program. Other accusations included 
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hiring lawyer James W. Sanderson as part-time advisor while he was still 
representing private clients—including a Chemical Waste Management, Inc.--, 
and, the most grave of them all, destroying records of a pending legal case in 
what became known as ―Sewergate.‖ Although Lavelle was arrested and other 
ten EPA officers lost their jobs in the scandal, Gorsuch, near the end of her term, 
avoided criminal charges and resigned in March, 1983. 256 
As the Federal Government seemed to have become a dead end for the 
Anti-toxic Movement‘s goals, they started to move the fight back to the local 
level. In a later statement for the ―Views from the former administrators‖ section 
of the EPA Journal, Gorsuch confirmed her will to make EPA ―lighter‖  and her 
intention to put the toxic waste fight back in the state level;  
My 22-month tenure as head of EPA was hardly the agency's most 
serene hour. By the time I left, the air was filled with so many 
charges, and the staff and I were so bogged down in the fight with 
Congress over the doctrine of executive privilege, that the agency 
itself seemed hardly to be functioning. … 
It should be remembered that I came to office as part of a new 
Administration that brought a different approach to solving the 
problems of government. One of the tenets of that approach was 
what we called New Federalism, or the idea that there were any 
number of services being provided by Uncle Sam that could be 
better provided by the states themselves.257 
 
Even before Gorsuch headed EPA, civil groups like Lois Gibbs‘s Citizens 
Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste started staffing up to do what EPA wouldn‘t: 
provide expert reports and analyses for local and state governments concerned 
with the proliferation of toxic-waste sites being revealed all around the country. 
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Again, the enemies were scientific uncertainty and lack of information about the 
causes and consequences of toxic spills, a situation that would start being 
reversed by some local struggles for the right to know. Coincidentally or not, one 
of the earliest cases happened in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, just across the 
river from CERCLA‘s drafter Jim J. Florio‘s political home: Camden, New Jersey.  
 “[A] model for the rest of the nation.”258 
 
In 1980, Ralph Nader‘s Health Research Group and the Philadelphia Area 
Project on Occupational Safety and Health proposed a toxic-right-to-know bill for 
Philadelphia. The bill was set to fill an information gap for workers and residents 
―who still [didn‘t] have a legal right to know about toxic substances in their 
workplaces and community‖ according to its proponents.259  
A story published in Chemical Week260 showed mixed reactions from 
industry. Philadelphia was home to more than 25 chemical companies at the 
time, including Rohm and Haas, SmithKline, Arco, DuPont, Gulf Oil, Armak, 
Purex and Pearsall. Robert Vogel, at the time chief of regulatory counsel of 
Rohm and Haas summarized the industry‘s position saying that his company 
―believes in the right to know,‖ but ―the bill produces no protection for legitimate 
industry trade secrets.‖261 
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The bill, a step forward from similar legislation either passed or being 
discussed in other localities in California, Connecticut, New York, and Wisconsin, 
passed six months after i ts proposition.262 Foreseeing a ―maze of local rules‖ 
following Philadelphia‘s legislation on the right to know, the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA)263 was compelled to act264 and to provide 
clearer standards then its previous rules, which permitted workers to examine 
and copy only their own workplace medical and toxic-exposure records.265 OSHA 
tried in vain to harmonize the new, more citizen-empowering bill with the 
concerns of industry. Thorne G. Auchter, then OSHA‘s head, told Chemical 
Week in 1982: ―We propose to permit employers to include more protective 
provisions in trade-secret confidentiality agreements with designated 
representatives, while at the same time enabling access.‖266  
OSHA‘s move was immediately rebuked by the director of the Health 
Research Group, one of the main proponents of the bill. Sidney M. Wolfe said 
that he believed OSHA was ―back-tracking‖ the legislation advancements. 
―OSHA is trying to broaden the definition of a trade secret,‖ he said adding that 
OSHA‘s proposition was against ―the letter and spirit‖ of earlier regulations.267 
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By 1983, OSHA‘s expressions of concern lest a ―maze of local 
[environmental] laws‖ spring up proved to be well founded.  By that year, 12 
states and two cities, Cincinnati and Philadelphia, passed right-to-know laws. 
Others, like Florida, followed the example.268 However, at the same time, some 
legislatures and courts were not upholding higher environmental standards.  
Courts in general still held that the absence of a federal standard for right-to-
know laws on toxic waste precluded the local and state legislation of creating 
more rigorous laws on the subject. On the other side, state legislatures and both 
state and federal agencies were influenced by legislators and company 
executives with stakes in keeping such laws at bay. The New York Times 
reported on one example in New Jersey: 
An ad hoc coalition of environmentalists, trade unionists and 
firefighters that has been supporting the state‘s proposed 
Community and Workers Right to Know Act has filed a conflict of 
interest charge against Borden R. Putnam, the state‘s 
Commissioner of Commerce and Economic Development . …  
The group, known as Citizens Action Right to Know Coalition told 
the state‘s Executive Commission on Ethical Standards last week 
that Mr. Putnam, a former senior vice president of the American 
Cyanamid Company of Bound Brook, still owned $400,000 worth of 
stock in the company. 
Because Mr. Putnam stanchly opposed the measure during State 
Senate hearings earlier this year, the group asserted, he violated 
the state‘s code of ethics for government employees.269 
 
The New York Times also reported that American Cyanamid‘s Bound 
Brook plant was on the EPA‘s superfund list and had been investigated before 
and charged with polluting the Raritan River.270 
                                                 
268
 “Workers‟ right-to-know moves into town,” Chemical Week , May 26, 1982, Top of the News, p. 13; 
“Florida‟s right-to-know push,” Chemical Week , May 11, 1983, Top of the News, p. 16.  
269
 Leo H. Carney, “Putnam accused of a conflict,”  The New York Times , April 24, 1983, Sect ion 11, New 
Jersey, p. 9. 
 101 
While local citizen groups were intensifying their fight for the right to know, 
a large group of New Jersey business owners got fearful and their 
representatives argued that the Community and Workers Right to Know Act 
would force business out of state if they had to reveal trade secrets to the 
competition. James C. Morford, a lobbyist and executive director of the New 
Jersey Chamber of Commerce at the time, summarized their view for The New 
York Times: 
―That‘s what makes us nervous,‖ said Mr. Morford, alluding to the 
disclosure requirement. ―It‘s not a matter of the public or 
environmental groups knowing, but the concern is the competitor.‖  
Mr. Morford said that the inadvertent disclosure of a trade secret by 
the Federal Environmental Protection Agency last year caused the 
Monsanto Company to lose a formula and, in the process, several 
hundred thousand dollars in potential revenue.271 
  
In the same story, both Morford and a spokesman for NL Industry—a 
producer of synthetic materials which had a plant closed in the previous year—
recognized that financial problems were the real reason companies in New 
Jersey were at peril, not environmental regulations, as Leo H. Charney reported:  
Mr. Morford acknowledged that no manufacturer had left the state 
since 1970 because of New Jersey's strict environmental laws.This 
last argument has been raised by environmentalists in support of 
their position. However, Mr. Morford contended that, because of 
poor economic conditions in general, and the ''lack of stability in the 
tax climate,'' the Dalton bill could put New Jersey businesses that 
were already in a precarious financial situation over the edge.272 
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Another evidence that environmental legislation were not at the core of 
the problem presented by Charney in his report was that six hundred people who 
were laid off from NL‘s plant joined the New Jersey OSHA/Environmental 
Network in support of the right-to-know bill as a demonstration that environmental 
and safety regulations were not to be feared.273 
At the federal level, ―Sewergate‖ was at its peak while Lois Gibbs‘s efforts 
to professionalize the Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste by adding 
scientists and social scientists to its staff were finally paying off. Barbara Mikulski, 
a Democrat Congresswoman for Maryland, after unsuccessfully trying to get EPA 
to look into a toxic-waste problem in her home district, accepted Gibbs‘s offer to 
use the Clearinghouse‘s expertise. 
―Ms. Gibbs,‖ Mikulski answered, ―I accept your offer. Yet it is really 
a bitter situation here. I worked all my life to become a member of 
Congress… Here we are, big wheels, often more self-important 
than we really are, and I can‘t get from Anne Gorsuch and her 
cronies… the help that I need . I have to come to a citizens group, 
that exists on voluntary contributions and bake sales.‖274 
 
After Gorsuch and like-minded colleagues left the EPA, the situation didn‘t 
change much. The Anti-toxic Movement needed a new push to get the fight back 
to the federal level once more and end the stalemate. Although thousands of 
toxic spill sites were being revealed in the U.S. between 1980 and 1985, the 
push came from elsewhere, in the form of a tragic accident in India.  
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“We are in the dark. We are at risk. We are playing chemical Russian 
roulette.”275 
 
On December 3, 1984, an accident in a Union Carbide pesticide plant 
caused the release of a cloud of toxic gas over Bhopal, a city located in the state 
of Madhya Pradesh in central India. Thousands died and many more fell ill from 
breathing the gas. 276 The news hit home less than a year later when another 
Union Carbide plant released a cloud of toxic gas over Institute, in West Virginia, 
as reported by the Los Angeles Times: 
The Institute factory had been touted by Union Carbide after the 
Bhopal accident as a model of chemical-industry safety. But it 
made headlines last Aug. 11 when an abandoned reactor tank, 
accidentally filled with toxic methylene chloride and other 
chemicals, boiled over and spewed 3,800 pounds of gas into a 
nearby neighborhood.277 
 
Right after the Bhopal disaster, a team of experts and politicians, among 
them Jim Florio, author of the Superfund law (CERCLA), visited the Institute 
facility and deemed it safe.  Another sign that even experts needed more 
information. The accident was less tragic than Bhopal only because the gas 
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leaked in an explosion, methylene chloride, in the Institute‘s plant was not nearly 
as lethal as the methyl isocyanate (MIC) released in Bhopal. Nonetheless, almost 
two hundred people were hospitalized, but nobody died. The incident could have 
been much worse: Institute‘s facility also stored MIC. 
The tragedy in Bhopal and the accident in the West Virginia at Union 
Carbide plants gave new life to the Anti-toxic Movement.  About the same time, 
the People of Color Environmental Movement was created after the tragedy 
involving a coal mine in Warren County in 1982. Representative Florio saw an 
opportunity to reinstall some of the provisions that were stripped from the 
previous version and to add a few more features based on the right-to-know laws 
as developed in New Jersey and the city of Philadelphia.  
Putting together all he learned from the failures of Superfund since the 
enactment of CERCLA in 1980 and aiming to provide citizens a weapon to 
protect them even from EPA if necessary, Florio and his staff worked on the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA). Among the goals of 
SARA was to reactivate the liability provisions of CERCLA, and re -empower local 
toxic-waste and right-to-know laws that were made moot by the lack of federal 
standards. However, according to Florio and, later, to legal analysts, the most 
important part of SARA was its Title III, a stand-alone piece of legislation focused 
on community empowerment based on emergency preparedness and the right to 
know.278 
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Referring to Bhopal and listing a series of accidents on American soil, 
including his failed hearing at Union Carbide‘s Institute plant right after the 
Bhopal tragedy, Florio wrote an opinion essay for The New York Times 
announcing a two-pronged effort to address the toxic problems: first, a 
comprehensive national investigation about ―the scope and nature of the 
deliberate venting of toxic chemicals into the environment,‖279 and, second, the 
legislation package later known as SARA. Florio pointed out that a ―key provision 
of the package creates the first comprehensive national community Right to 
Know program.‖280 
Not two full months after Florio‘s opinion article, a chemical fire engulfed 
four blocks of an industrial center in Passaic, New Jersey.  A fireman died, 12 
people were injured, and 400 people were left homeless.  Donald A. Deieso, 
director of environmental quality for the New Jersey‘s Department of 
Environmental Protection, said in an interview for the New York Times after the 
accident in Passaic that the ―unavailability of information on what chemicals were 
used and stored in the factories and warehouses was ‗an atrocity.‘‖ 281  ―The 
situation itself was glaring testimony for right-to-know legislation,‖ Deieso 
added.282 At that point, New Jersey had its Community and Worker Right-to-know 
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Act incapacitated by a Federal court ruling saying that less-stringent Federal 
regulations took precedent over specific parts of the state law.283  
The accident in Passaic, among many others, led Florio to take action 
once again. In the New Jersey Opinion section of the New York Times, Florio 
repeated some of his arguments of his previous letter284 (especially the 
explanation of the how the new amendments he proposed would allow New 
Jersey to reactivate its Community and Worker Right-to-know Act) adding a 
vehement reprimand against the Reagan Administration, industry lobbyists, and 
a number of congressmen: 
If we are to eradicate the environmental nightmares that surround 
us, we need a strong, effective Superfund hazardous-waste 
cleanup program. But Superfund is in trouble. A coalition comprised 
of the Reagan Administration, chemical-industry lobbyists and their 
allies in Congress banded together to push through a House 
committee legislation that fails to implement desperately needed 
and fundamental reforms of the Superfund program.285 
 
Later in the in article, Florio readdressed his improvements of the bill, 
which he explained in the previous article, and attacked EPA for failing to enforce 
anti-toxic laws. In one specific example, Florio mentioned that EPA failed to 
include dioxins, PCBs, phosgene or methyl isocyanate (the same of Bhopal‘s 
catastrophe) in the list of chemicals that should be evaluated and have their 
emissions limited. EPA officials told Florio‘s subcommittee that they ―had not 
determined that the chemical [methyl isocyanate] was life-threatening or needed 
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to be regulated.‖ In Florio‘s opinion, the U.S. government was regulating ―by luck 
and chance.‖286 
Florio was not reacting only to the events in New Jersey. Two days 
earlier, the U.S. Senate voted to provide $7.5 billion for five more years of 
Superfund. The massive victory (86 to 13) ―reflected the broad public acceptance 
and political potency that hazardous waste legislation has acquired since it was 
first enacted,‖287 as Philip Shabecoff reported on the front page of The New York 
Times. Florio knew that he had public support and that he had a unique 
opportunity to add what he called ―the much needed amendments‖ to the bill 
before the chemical-industry lobby could make it innocuous.288 
 
“Only the tip of the toxic iceberg”289 
 
Florio, as the Chairman of the House of Representatives‘ Subcommittee 
on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism, found himself in the right position to 
take the superfund amendments ahead. Florio held a hearing290 in Minnesota on 
December 20, 1985 where the main provisions of SARA were discussed. With 
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the New Jersey‘s right-to-know regulation preclusion in mind, Florio opened the 
hearing: 
The State should not take the lead in this area, for fear that State‘s 
industries might move elsewhere in response to these new 
requirements. That, it seems to me, is more than a strong argument 
for the need for national uniformity in our environmental laws so we 
don‘t have economics operating at cross purposes with appropriate 
environmental protection, including the need for a national uniform 
community right-to-know standard.291 
 
The state of Minnesota hadn‘t passed a right-to-know law and two local 
congressmen who were at the top of the issue with Florio, Representatives Gerry 
Sirkorski and Bruce F. Vento, were looking to push the right-to-know law on the 
federal level. Sikorski described toxic-waste tragedies like Love Canal, Times 
Beach,292 and Reilly Tar293 and pointed out the need for a better legislation: 
Love Canal and Times Beach and Reilly Tar are only the tip of the 
toxic iceberg. At thousands of waste sites across the country, 
poisonous chemicals are seeping into our land, contaminating our 
water, and fouling our air. In 1980, due in large measure to your 
perseverance, Congress enacted the Superfund Program, and you 
were the chief proponent of it. Its purpose was to clean up the 
Nation‘s worst abandoned sites. Five years later the report card is 
unsatisfactory.294 
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Sikorski explained that after five years at least 23,000 waste sites were 
found to be contaminated with toxic sludge; a number that could reach 300,000. 
Only 850 were added to the National Priority List and, after the expenditure of 
$1.6 billion, not even one site had been ―completely and adequately cleaned 
up.‖295 Sikorski also narrated how he introduced and fought together with Florio 
for a bill aiming to correct the problems with Superfund. He cited ―citizens suits 
and schedules and standards and a cleanup program for leaking underground 
storage tanks, the LUST program, and strong provisions in Federal sites, and 
community right to know‖ as the main provisions he and Florio were able to pass 
in the House after a ―lonely fight in subcommittee and in full Energy and 
Commerce Committee.‖296 
Millions of Americans in thousands of neighborhoods exposed to 
toxic chemicals have a simple, a fundamental right to know about 
what chemicals, toxic chemicals, are being released into their 
environment hour after hour, day after day, year after year. The 
House bill, through our efforts, guarantees that Americans will be 
provided with this information.297 
 
Equating federally owned and privately owned sites by enforcing the same 
standards, deadlines, and oversight, Sikorski contended that the bill would 
address the concerns of the private sector as well as of citizens groups. At the 
same time, the provision allowing citizens‘ suits would prevent EPA internal 
politics from inaction as federal agencies could also be prosecuted if they refused 
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or failed to do their jobs. For Sikorski, the only blemish of the new bill was that 
they (Sikorski, Vento,298 and Florio) failed to convince the Committee to include 
Bruce Vento‘s amendment ―allowing the fund to reimburse municipalities for new 
costs in providing or acquiring alternative water supplies where a Federal agency 
is a responsible party.‖299 
Vento‘s testimony started with the same recognition of Florio‘s work and 
then the specific casea of some municipalities in Minnesota having to pay to 
clean drinking water contaminated by federa l facilities. Vento specifically was 
upset with some dangerously toxic facilities of the Department of Defense (DOD) 
and wanted the legislation to be clear that DOD would have to work with the 
same standards and deadlines as everybody else. He identified at least 33 DOD 
sites that needed to be cleaned up and mentioned that the Department of 
Energy300 and other federal agencies probably had many more in the same 
conditions. 
Mr. Chairman, how can we expect the EPA to be successful in 
cleaning up privately owned hazardous waste sites when the 
Federal Government itself drags its feet in cleaning up its own 
sites? … The citizens we represent are just as affected whether the 
source of toxic pollutants is private or public.301 
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“Fundamental bits of information”302  
 
The hearing proceeded to two panels, one on the right to know and the 
other addressing jurisdictional issues of governmental facilities included in the 
new law. The first panel included the testimony of Darby Nelson, Minnesota State 
Representative, and Peggy Ladner, speaking for the Clean Water Action Project. 
Nelson started by comparing the environmental risks of the past, like cholera and 
horse flies,303 with the new environmental risks posed by toxic chemicals. 
In those days, the environmental hazards, once understood, were 
locatable and identifiable for all to see and for all to respond 
accordingly. … [P]eople are simply unable in 1985 to properly make 
those kinds of decisions about where they want to live, where they 
want to recreate relative to potential health risks, and I guess the 
fundamental role of government in my mind, and I would hope in 
others, must be to do those necessary things for people that they 
are simply unable to do for themselves.304 
 
In sequence, Nelson summarized not only the need for citizens‘ right to 
know about toxic emissions and the location of toxic waste sites, but gave it both 
an ethical justification and a future: 
Certainly relative to community emergency planning it is incredibly 
important that those locations be known and understood. It is 
absolutely essential for firefighters, both for their personal safety as 
well as for the safety of folks living in the immediate neighborhoods 
where these materials are being stored and released, that those 
fundamental bits of information be provided. 
Third, we simply must provide people with information that may, in 
fact, impact their chances of developing cancer, producing children 
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with birth defects and other health problems. The issue, I think, is 
absolutely fundamental and simple. People want to have maximum 
direct control over their own lives. A community‘s right-to-know 
regarding placement and emission of potentially hazardous 
materials is a logical and I think important extension of consumer 
labeling, cigarette health warnings, workers‘ right-to-know, and the 
like. A person ought to have the right to intelligent, educated, 
personal choice about the relative degree of risk he or she finds 
personally acceptable. 
Community right-to-know in addition to that I think can be a source 
of incredible valuable long-term epidemiological data in 
environmental risk factors.305 
 
Nelson‘s testimony embodied most of the intent with which Florio had 
written the law, but also based the reasoning behind the right to know on the 
principle of self-governance and the simple principle that, as he described, had 
been applied to other laws, that it is the people and not government or industry 
who have the right to choose the amount of environmental and health risks with 
which they are willing to live. However, to be able to exercise such right, people 
need to be educated about those risks. 
Nelson also commented on the need for a federal law, mentioning his 
1984 rejected bill in Minnesota as an argument for the need of the federal 
government‘s involvement to set the example. Nelson listed the same objections 
by the opposition for the rejection of the bill that Florio experienced in New 
Jersey: Minnesota‘s business owners complained that such bill at the state level 
would create extra paperwork, secret information would be compromised, and 
costs of doing business in the state would drive businesses away. Nelson wasn‘t 
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finished, though. After accusing President Reagan, the Senate, and specifically 
EPA for their inaction, he mocked the absurdity of the situation: 
If the Soviet Union had secretly conspired to deposit these 
thousands of leaking hazardous waste sites around the country to 
insidiously damage our groundwater and the health of our citizens, 
such action would clearly have been labeled the most heinous act 
of biological warfare. There are times I wish the Russians had done 
it, because if the Russians had done it, perhaps the cleanup would 
be considered part of the national defense, would come under the 
defense budget, and perhaps we would not have had to have 
waited for 5 years and see so little have been accomplished if that 
had been the case. Federal inaction has simply dumbfounded 
me.306  
 
“The opponents said that being responsible for that safety or injury was 
too expensive. … [I]t convinced a lot of legislators that safety from toxics 
was not worth it.”307 
 
Peggy Ladner, Midwest Director for Clean Water Action Project, followed 
Nelson‘s testimony and focused her opening statement on the arguments raised 
by industry representatives against right-to-know laws. According to Ladner, the 
threats of deserting the state made by business owners were moot, because the 
real problem was not the costs associated with the right-to-know laws, but the 
high prices of liability insurance in case the law held them liable. ―We knew they 
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would not be able to get environmental impairment liability insurance no matter 
where they went.‖308 
For Ladner, it didn‘t matter where the companies would move, the 
insurance companies would apply the same standards in Texas or California.309 
The problem in her view, wasn‘t the argument, but the perception created by it. 
The fear provoked by the threat was enough to convince legislators to reject 
right-to-know provisions in Minnesota. ―That tactic has been used in North 
Carolina, in New Jersey, in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and many other States,‖ Ladner 
said. ―We cannot solve this problem in Minnesota. It has to come from 
Washington. Congress must put an end to State shopping, or at least the threat 
of it, by polluters,‖ she added.310 
In her written statement, Ladner emphasized several reasons for federal 
statutory involvement in the matter:  lack of uniformity between and among 
states, similar to a situation that Florio had witnessed between Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey. Ladner declared:  
It‘s not OK for people in New Jersey to have the right-to-know while 
people in Minnesota do not. It‘s not OK for our neighbors in 
Wisconsin to go uncompensated for medical expenses due to toxic 
exposure while Minnesotans may apply to the victim‘s 
compensation fund. 
   
Ladner also addressed some problems created by the Reagan 
Administration in the EPA by cutting agency staff and support services for 
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mandated programs311 and recommended the passage of a strong right-to-know 
program as ―the first step towards long-term solutions.‖ For Ladner, besides the 
predictions made by Nelson about the data on toxic chemicals, she added that 
with better science linking toxic chemicals to health problems, polluters would 
have two choices: either accept almost certain liability or find ways to reduce 
hazardous waste. ―We believe responsible business people will certainly choose 
the latter,‖ she concluded before presenting 100,000 signatures the Clean Water 
Action collected in Minnesota in support of the law.312 
With such arguments collected, Florio felt he had demonstrated that there 
was a need for a federal law and that the purpose of the law was to put the cost 
of information-gathering on polluters, the burden of overseeing and storing the 
information on local and federal governments, and the responsibility of enforcing 
the law on citizens. Florio then prepared his bill and his arguments knowing that 
he had enough support to take it to the congressional conference. 
In 1986, after the committee and congressional conferences, the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act was enacted. Finally, the 
national campaign against toxic waste had won the war for the right to know. 
However, it had also won the responsibility of proving that informed citizens 
would do their part. And for that purpose, they needed more than information: 
they needed education. 
                                                 
311
 Although, Ladner did not mention Anne Gorsuch in her statement, she was probably aware of 
“Sewergate” as Ladner had worked with the National Toxic Campaign Aga inst Toxic Hazards since 1982. 
312
 Ladner. Hearing before the Subcommittee, p. 15.  
 116 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-know Act was the 
first federal environmental law requiring that information be made 
directly available to the general public through a variety of 
mechanisms. The law has been criticized for many reasons, and 
one of the most deep rooted criticisms is that the law provides the 
―right-to-know‖ but not the ―right-to-understand.‖313 
 
“It‟s what he calls „risk communications.‟”314 
 
The enactment of EPCRA provoked a surprising change of tone from the 
industry representatives. Many large chemical companies tried to be among the 
first to voice their support for the law against which they had fought so fiercely. 
Newspapers reported a series of examples where industry worked with citizens 
groups to diminish the use of toxic and hazardous materials in the years following 
the enactment of EPCRA.315 The enactment of a federal law nullified the ―state 
shopping‖ arguments and also provided one simpler standard for all, instead of 
the ―maze‖ of state and local legislations predicted by OSHA.316 
The agricultural chemical industry joined in an unusual alliance with 
environmental and consumer groups today to propose specific 
legislation to strengthen the law controlling the use of pesticides. 
The legislation would speed health and safety testing of pesticides 
already in use and impose a fee on their manufacturers to help pay 
for the tests.317 
 
                                                 
313
 June C. Bolstridge. 1992. EPCRA Data. 
314
 James B. Lindheim, executive vice president, director of public affairs of Burston -Marsteller, a 
subsidiary of Young & Rubicam. Quoted in Philip H. Dougherty, “Environmental specialty is booming,” 
The New York Times, January 14, 1988, p. 23.  
315
 Dennis Melamed, “EPA‟s right-to-know net widens,” Chemical Week , Top of the News, p. 16. 
316
 “States get back in the act on right to know,” Chemical Week , October 22, 1986, Washington 
Newsletter, p. 86. 
317
 Philip Shabecoff, “Industry and consumer groups join to ask pesticide law changes,” The New York 
Times, March 11, 1986, Sect ion A, p. 23.  
 117 
Politicians also jumped on the bandwagon declaring how all sides were 
cooperating for the success of EPCRA. Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-New 
Jersey), who got the cartoon-character-style nickname ―Toxic Avenger‖ after 
being appointed to head the Senate Superfund Oversight Subcommittee, told 
reporters that he fought particularly hard to defend Florio‘s ―right to know‖ 
language in the bill. Ever the politician, Lautenberg also praised the role of 
industry in the process, saying industry leaders approved the final legislation and 
helped draft it, but also tried to please right-to-know defenders: 
―We don‘t want to pester them [chemical companies] to death,‖ he 
said, ―and we don‘t want to make our chemical industry 
noncompetitive. But we believe our citizens in every community 
have a right to live without fear of pollution or contamination from a 
nearby industrial facility.‖318 
 
One reason behind this friendly environment could have been that, once 
enacted, EPCRA not only empowered citizens to sue companies and 
government agencies that were not in compliance or not doing their jobs, but also 
reactivated stricter state legislation, such as New Jersey‘s Community and 
Worker Right-to-know Act.319 In that way, EPCRA created a massive trickledown 
effect that put the power of enforcement in the hands of thousands of 
environmental and environmental justice organizations and citizens‘ committees. 
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Even if the lawsuits were not successful,320 the expenditures with legal costs and 
scientific investigations could have been monstrous both for private corporations 
and governmental agencies. The law charged them for the costs of any 
investigations carried out by citizens. EPCRA had its first success: it scared 
companies and governmental agencies into collaboration. 
Another consequence of EPCRA was the expansion of a whole area of 
expertise in public relations. Because of the toughening of public attitudes on 
environmental problems, industry needed to deal with the situation in a different 
way.321 Crisis management and risk communication became buzzwords as 
industry executives named liability and corporate responsibility as the forces 
behind the new approach: 
For corporations today, a prime concern is the potential liability they 
face from the abandoned dumps, according to Lloyd N. Newman, 
executive vice president of Manning, Selvage & Lee, a subsidiary of 
D‘Arcy Masius Benton & Bowles. He added that a number of 
companies also feel some moral responsibility.322 
 
In the same story, another executive described the generic changes in 
corporate practice the new approach would entail: 
He said that ―companies are going to have to put information in 
perspective so people are not unduly concerned about the data‖ 
that are being supplied to the local committees. To that end his staff 
is prepared to develop brochures, videos and slide presentations to 
explain a company‘s compliance with the law. He also has a 
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sensitivity-training program to teach employees to communicate 
with a plant‘s neighbors.323 
 
For some companies, which believed EPCRA was a beneficial evolution, 
risk communication was used not only to improve relationships with local 
communities and government, but also to identify new possibilities for future 
profits. For the other companies, ―risk communication‖ quickly became a 
synonym for a practice later known as ―green wash.‖    
 “The days are over when industry can just dump anything and say, „Trust 
us on this‟”324 
 
Two years after the enactment of EPCRA, the deadline for the first Toxic 
Release Inventory (TRI) was approaching and newspapers reported on the 
―revolution‖325 created by EPCRA‘s right-to-know approach. More than 200,000 
people distributed in approximately 3,000 committees were set up to handle the 
flood of information coming from an estimated 30,000 industrial facilities.326 
However, the greatest ―revolution‖ according to Charles Elkins, director of EPA‘s 
office of toxic substances at the time, was that data on chemical hazards in 
communities were going to be in people‘s home computers.327 
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James L. Makris, director of emergency response programs for EPA at 
the time, expected that TRI would ―open a national dialogue around the issue of 
chemical risk.‖328 Lee M. Thomas, Administrator of EPA at the time, said the 
whole thing could be something negative as it meant ―a lot of paperwork,‖ but he 
believed that, in a final analysis, it could be ―very significant in shaping the way 
the public views environmental issues and sets priorities on those issues.‖329 
The expectations around the results of the first TRI to be released in July 
1988 were very high. The most important concept at stake was Florio‘s idea that 
the right to know would really get people to act and do their part. ―The ultimate 
question is, will we achieve the Jeffersonian ideal of informed citizens who can 
take a responsible role in making public policy?‖ Michael S. Baram, professor of 
law at Boston University‘s Center for Law and Technology, summarized. 330 
The answer to Baram‘s question came swiftly as companies in general 
were trying to adapt to the new requirements, which demanded almost twice as 
much work as EPA initially predicted, and were surprised by their own reports 
and afraid of the public‘s reaction: 
―The figures would come out as thousands of pounds‖ of chemicals 
a year, said Medhat Reiser, Nespera‘s environmental affairs 
director. ―When people see big figures like that, they are always 
immediately scared.‖331 
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However, industry, government, and citizens noted a difference in how the 
roles of industry in communities changed as a result of EPCRA. The results of 
the first TRI showed an amount of toxic chemicals much higher than anyone 
expected.332 EPCRA, which required the creation of local emergency 
committees, forced industry to deal with the consequences of its production face-
to-face with local communities for the first time.333  
Many corporations started immediate changes in their production systems 
aiming to reduce and, in some cases, to completely stop the use of toxic and 
hazardous chemicals. In 1988, just two years after EPCRA became law, Garland 
Ross, a senior engineer at Yale Materials, told Charles L. Elkins, EPA‘s director 
of the Office of Toxic Substances, that EPCRA was having a real effect. Ross 
said that his company already had started to change the chemicals it used for the 
next year.  He added, ―I hope we can [then] report that  Yale has no toxic 
chemicals to report.334 
Representatives of Monsanto—one of the largest producers of pesticides 
and other toxic chemicals—recognized that TRI pushed them to reconsider how 
effectively they used raw materials. It also transformed what began as an 
environmental measure into a cost-control program as well.335 
                                                 
332
 A report showed, among other unexpected results, that even the Capitol and the White House were 
threatened by poor storage of chlorine in the water treatment plant for the District of Columbia. Philip 
Shabecoff, “The early returns of a toxic poll,” The New York Times, November 20, 1988, Section 3, p.10.  
333
 Ibid.; Charles L. Elkins, “Toxic chemicals, the right response,” The New York Times, November 13, 
1988, Business Forum: Corporate Citizenship, Sect ion 3, p. 3.  
334
 Garland Ross. Quoted in Elkins, “Toxic chemicals, the right response.” 
335
 Keith Schneider, “Toxic pollut ion shows drop in ‟89,” The New York Times, May, 17, 1991, Section A, 
p. 32. 
 122 
Not long after the first TRI, President George H. W. Bush‘s administration 
and Congress passed a new Clean Water Act336 and the Clean Air Act,337 and he 
became known as the ―environmental president.‖338 After a few years TRI 
brought the confirmation that EPCRA was, at least in part, a success. ―The total 
releases in 1989 were 1.3 billion pounds less than that reported in 1987, and 723 
million pounds less than industries released in 1988,‖ reported The New York 
Times.339 However, there were still 22,650 industrial plants releasing 5.7 billion 
pounds of toxic chemicals into the environment, which added to the cumulative 
effects and the spreading of contaminated sites. The public wanted more and 
faster remedies, the story asserted: ―Today a coalition of 16 national 
environmental groups and 80 state and community organizations released its 
own report that said the Toxic Release Inventory does not go far enough in 
accounting for pollution.‖340 
The coalition pressured EPA to expand the list of chemicals in TRI and to 
include other measurements that included not only the release and storage of 
toxic chemicals, but also their use during the manufacturing process. From 1991 
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to 1994, most of the news mentioning EPCRA or related topics referred to 
specific contamination issues and health problems in different localities, including 
the area that would later be called ―Cancer Alley‖ between the states of Texas 
and Louisiana. 
EPA would respond in part, by doubling the list of chemicals in 1994, 
during the administration of Bill Clinton, who openly defended EPCRA‘s right-to-
know provisions against a legislative attempt to weaken EPCRA that failed to 
pass in the Senate in 1995.341 The attempt followed an industry reaction against 
EPA expansion of the TRI with the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA) 
filing a lawsuit against EPA, which was decided in the agency‘s favor in 1996.342 
John H. Cushman Jr. reported for The New York Times in June 1995: 
Senators attacking Federal regulations have taken aim at what 
would seem to be one of the least burdensome but most effective 
of environmental rules: a requirement that manufacturers disclose 
how much they pollute. 
Senators J. Bennet Johnston, Democrat from Louisiana, and Trent 
Lott, Republican of Mississippi, are trying now to narrow the 
program that costs little besides paperwork and requires no specific 
pollution controls but that has spurred industry to reduce emissions 
of toxic chemicals voluntarily by billions of pounds a year.343  
 
By 1995, TRI reported total releases of 2.8 billion pounds, a 43% drop in 
releases since the first TRI in 1988. Carol M. Browner, EPA‘s Administrator at the 
time, representatives of the Environmental Justice Movement and other citizens 
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groups, specialists from environmental groups, and even part of the industry 
associated with the Chemical Manufacturers Association went out in defense of 
EPCRA. The attacks from Association and the senators from the top polluter 
states prompted, among other things, an open defense of EPCRA in President 
Bill Clinton‘s State of the Union Address: 
I applaud your desire to get rid of costly and unnecessary 
regulations, but when we deregulate let‘s remember what national 
action in the national interest has given us: safer food for our 
families, safer toys for our children, safer nursing homes for our 
parents, safer cars and highways and safer workplaces, cleaner air 
and cleaner water. Do we need common sense and fairness in our 
regulations? You bet we do. But we can have common sense and 
still provide for safe drinking water. We can have fairness and still 
clean up toxic dumps and we ought to do it.344 
 
Clinton later announced that 50 Republicans broke ―ranks in the House 
and said they would put the environment ahead of party,‖ after the bill attacking 
EPCRA and other environmental laws was rejected on the House floor.345 In the 
same year, Clinton also signed an executive order to force industry to comply 
with the expanded list of toxics. Clinton used the force of the federal 
government‘s contracts to indicate what industry could lose if they chose not to 
comply, as Jacobson narrated:  
President Clinton was an especially strong advocate of right-to-
know legislation, at least publicly. In 1995 he signed Executive 
Order 12,969 as part of a fierce budget battle between his 
administration and the Republican-led Congress. The Executive 
Order was announced at a highly publicized signing ceremony in 
Baltimore attended by 400 local citizens, politicians, environmental 
groups, and unions. … He then explained the Executive Order by 
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saying, ―I signed an executive order which says any manufacturer 
who wants to do business with the federal government must tell its 
neighbors what dangerous chemicals it puts into the air, the earth, 
and the water.‖346 
 
In 1997, EPA finally published the expanded TRI. The new TRI included 
more analytical tools for its interpretation, making it easier on the general public, 
especially environmental justice organizations, to understand its reports. 
Unfortunately, a new law in 1999 stopped the improved TRI information from 
being published because Congress thought such information might be used by 
terrorists in planning attacks. OMB Watch,347 a watchdog organization for open 
government and the right to know in environmental issues, took on the 
responsibility predicted by Florio and published on their website what EPA was 
forbidden to publish.348 OMB later created the ―Right-to-know Network‖ based on 
that report. 
Advocates of releasing the information say the compilation of the 
summaries could show the public that the information was kept off 
the Internet more to avoid embarrassing chemical companies than 
to impede terrorists. They say that hundreds of accidents occur at 
plants each year, although the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
acknowledged only a single thwarted act of sabotage, against a 
chemical plant in 1997.349 
 
From that point on, and over and over again, the ―terrorism argument‖ 
would come back, made either by industry or government, only to be disproved, 
especially after the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon in 2001. 
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However, the work of environmental justice and anti-toxic groups, plus some 
sectors of the news media and citizens‘ organizations including OMB Watch 
would make sure that much environmental awareness information would be 
available to the public. By the end of President George W. Bush‘s Administration 
on January 20, 2009, EPCRA still remained the most comprehensive example of 
a right-to-know approach in the United States. Environmental justice and anti-
toxic groups were still pushing for new laws that include reports of toxic and 
hazardous materials used in manufactured products using a right-to-know 
approach.  
EPCRA was reasonably successful in its role, but not without obstacles. 
The most powerful threat to the idea of the public‘s right to know came in the 
form of a reaction against the terrorist attack of 2001.  
Four airplanes were taken down by terrorists associated with the extremist 
group Al-Qaida on September 11, 2001, causing the destruction of the World 
Trade Center towers and surrounding buildings in New York and damage to the 
Pentagon in Washington D.C. resulting in nearly 3,000 deaths. The attacks led to 
heavy reassessments on whether information about potential targets for terrorists 
should be disclosed in any way. 
The issue has generated fierce debate between environmental 
activists and industry representatives. The focus of the debate has 
been on the conflict between dissemination of information to the 
public and attempting to keep potentially harmful data out of the 
hands of terrorists.350 
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Soon after the attacks many governmental agencies began to pull 
sensitive information from their websites and other sources.351 The U.S. 
Geological Survey, for an example, recalled CD-ROMs containing information on 
bodies of water and asked all recipients to return them to the agency to protect 
lakes and rivers from terrorist attacks.352 The Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
(―Patriot Act‖), passed by the U.S. Congress in reaction to the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001, significantly altered a considerable number of laws, including 
many related to information policy.  
With the introduction of the Patriot Act353 in October 2001 and the Critical 
Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (CIIA), many corporations used the excuse 
of protecting sensitive targets from terrorist attacks to stop providing information 
about hazardous materials to communities under the EPCRA. 354  
While the discussion between national security and community‘s right to 
know have become very inflamed,355 the legal literature tends to support the idea 
that community‘s right to know did not hamper efforts to improve national 
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security, and it actually improved safety and security awareness in the involved 
communities.356  
Chekouras listed a few ways of how states used legal measures to attend 
the community‘s right to know without putting homeland  security in harm‘s way. 
The use of the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) predicated in EPCRA357 is one of 
them: 
In this ever-changing atmosphere, states maintain the ability to 
supplement EPCRA and maintain or enhance the dissemination of 
information to communities. With TRI being heralded as an 
effective method of decreasing toxics, state efforts at maintaining 
tough public disclosure requirements may continue to ensure safer 
facilities. By requiring information that is beneficial to local 
communities while respecting legitimate security concerns, states 
can reduce the hazards present and decrease chemical facilities‘ 
attractiveness as terrorist targets.358  
 
 
This chapter showed the resilience of EPCRA even when it was under 
attack by industry, Congress, and the Executive power together. Florio‘s intent to 
create a law that would resist the lethargy of EPA resulted in a law that, based on 
the right-to-know principle, kept creating opportunities for citizens to organize and 
hold both government and industry accountable for pollution and environmental 
injustices. 
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CHAPTER 5: ENVIRONMENTAL RISK COMMUNICATION IN EPCRA 
 
―I‘ll tell you 
What the world‘s like: like a stone for no reason falling in the night 
from a cliff in the hills, that makes a lonely 
Noise and a spark in the hollow darkness, and nobody sees and 
nobody cares. There‘s nothing good in it 
Except the courage in us not to be beaten. It can‘t make us  
Cringe or say please.‖ 
Robinson Jeffers 359 
 
As Ulrich Beck predicted,360 the risk society of the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries has shown that exclusive reliance on ―command and control‖ 
governance is not sufficient.  With that approach, government sets and enforces 
(sometimes half-heartedly) rules (often weak) through penalties, and that has not 
worked adequately.  The proof is in the pollution.  Also, ―market-based‖ 
palliatives such as offering tax reduction incentives to industries have proven not 
to reduce risks efficiently or sufficiently. Again, the proof is in the pollution. 361 
Beck‘s argued presciently that only with community involvement in 
resolving public policy issues will nations be able to reduce risks by increasing 
personal and public responsibility on one side, and governmental and corporate 
accountability on the other.362  
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Hadden‘s called for institutions that ―allow and encourage citizens to work 
with both government and private industry.‖363 According to her, that would 
transform the right to know into a right to participate in the formulation of policies. 
Hadden‘s call presented a challenge yet to be met by environmental and risk 
communicators, governmental agencies and policymakers. EPCRA‘s history 
shows the attempts of Representative James J. Florio of making the right to 
know larger than a law: a new approach to public policy. The ability of 
environmental justice organizations and the general public of improving EPCRA 
depends in great part on their ability of understanding information and of using 
communication to get organized and participate in the decision making, as 
Shapiro found.364 The role of environmental risk communicators in citizen 
organizations becomes ever more crucial, then, as they are specialists in 
understanding and translating scientific and legal information into meaningful and 
useful information to the lay public.  
EPCRA‘s history also shows that the law pushed, at least partially, 
industry into creating better practices that reduced the use of dangerous 
materials and encouraged safer ways to work with them. Far from an ideal 
situation, EPCRA was created to be a ―first step‖ of a new legislation system to 
control, and maybe eliminate, the release of toxic and hazardous chemicals into 
the environment and communities.  
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This chapter will present first a brief legal analysis of how EPCRA works, 
and then offers a critical look into how the history of EPCRA contributed to the 
study of environmental risk communication.  
A legal description of EPCRA 
 
EPCRA, passed by the U.S. Congress in 1986, listed 400 out of 60,000 
chemicals in commercial use in the United States as extremely hazardous.365 
The right to know observed in environmental impact statements obligates risk-
generating organizations to provide complete, truthful, and accurate reports 
about toxic and hazardous materials to the local governments.366 The burden of 
revelation fell on the risk-generating organization, not on the government, which, 
according to Hadden, should ―ensure that the other parties can exercise their 
rights and fulfill their responsibilities . . . [by] designing and, if necessary, 
redesigning public policies.‖367 
EPCRA also allowed citizens to enforce the law through civil suits368 
based on any of the civil, administrative, or criminal penalties listed on section 
325, which include the failure to provide complete, truthful, and accurate 
information. However, to be able to enforce the law, citizens needed first to be 
able to access, understand, and process the information into action.369 According 
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to EPA‘s own regulation, EPA has an ―affirmative responsibility‖ to collect and 
disseminate information to further public health and environmental goals: 
―Empowering the public with information helps assure [industry] compliance with 
existing laws and encourages companies to take additional measures to reduce 
industrial chemical releases.‖ 370 
One way EPCRA promotes public participation in the decision-making 
process is through the requirement of the formation of Local Emergency Planning 
Committees (LEPC), which are designed to plan for manufacturing emergencies 
and to serve as monthly community forums where local residents, government 
officials, industry representatives, health and safety officials, and any concerned 
individuals and organizations can request information and voice concerns.371 
EPCRA and LEPCs have four major provisions: emergency planning,372 
emergency release notification,373 hazardous chemical storage reporting 
requirements,374 and the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI),375 which requires a 
publicly available EPA database that contains information on toxic chemical 
releases and other waste management activities reported annually by certain 
covered industry groups as well as federal facilities. 
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By putting the burden of revelation on risk generators and mandating 
community-right-to-know practices, EPCRA allowed communicators in non-
governmental organizations, governmental agencies, corporations, and media 
outlets to take the law beyond the boundaries of government enforcement and 
transform it into a more participatory and democratic tool. At the same time, it 
costs less for the government to enforce the law—as risk-generating companies 
pay for the paperwork and communication. Also, revelation increases community 
awareness of the problems they may have in case of a toxic spill or discharge. 
Sometimes, this awareness can even bring companies to change the chemicals 
for less toxic ones and improve security and quality of life for all in the 
community.376 
EPCRA‟s opportunities for environmental risk communication 
 
The intent behind EPCRA, as seen in chapter 4, was to bring the public 
into the policy process. Since its adoption, the public has been invited to voice 
their opinions and to participate in the process, especially in EPCRA‘s 
enforcement and reevaluation. The structure of EPCRA, as seen above, differs 
from the structure of most laws as it follows a tripartite-dialogical approach 
between public, industry, and government based on information, as Bolstridge 
wrote:  
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Most importantly, EPCRA did not require the EPA to evaluate or 
interpret the information collected, but only to make the information 
available in its original form and through some specific types of 
reports and analyses. The law is based on the premise that it is the 
responsibility of the public to ask questions and of facilities to 
address questions as they arise.377 
 
The contribution of EPCRA to the policy process after the failure of 
previous legislations, in consonance with Beck‘s description of the failure of 
governmental institutions in Risk Society, was to provide a way for society to 
achieve a necessary social goal—the reduction of environmental and health risks 
related to toxic and hazardous materials—despite the inefficiency of government. 
However, as noted by Bolstridge,378 EPCRA intentionally did not provide some of 
the tools to transform simple information into a true participatory system.  
According to Florio‘s own writings,379 EPCRA , as an amendment to 
CERCLA, was a provision that should be easy for industry to comply with,380 
inexpensive for government to administer, and empowering to citizens. The idea 
was that, once the information was compiled and published, scientists and 
citizens‘ groups could use it to make connections and see which facilities were in 
compliance with the earlier federal environmental legislations and the local and 
state laws and regulations.  
An interesting result of EPCRA was that it also allowed the facilities to 
keep an inventory of the amount of materials being wasted as seen in both 
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Monsanto and Yale Industries,381 allowing these companies to save money on 
top of getting better environmental standards. Moreover, provisions that allowed 
citizens to file lawsuits not only against facilities, but also against governmental 
agencies, gave ―teeth‖ to the law, as Ladner mentioned during the 1985 hearing 
on EPCRA.382 
In addition, the most important result of EPCRA was forcing industry 
representatives and government officials to sit down with community members 
and talk to them: explain what they were doing, how they were doing it, and why 
they were doing it. This information allows community members to choose the 
amount of risk they will accept to bear in exchange for economic and social 
benefits provided by the presence of the company in their neighborhood. 
However, as seen in a few cases, these relationships ended up freeing some 
communities from further exposures to toxic and hazardous materials.  
EPCRA was not a law made to regulate toxic chemicals but to compel the 
enforcement of other laws that were already in place and to foster the creation of 
new and better ones. Most importantly, EPCRA was designed to get all groups 
involved to sit together and find solutions. An effort envisioned by Florio in face of 
the failure of previous approaches to the problem. This may not have worked in a 
large number of cases because of insufficient community leadership or an 
apathetic citizenry,383 but it certainly was an improvement to the state of affairs 
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existing before the enactment of the law.  The premise and promise of EPCRA is 
a systemic approach to policy based fundamentally on communication to create 
an informed public. Therefore, right-to-know laws are different from command-
and-control and market-based laws, as Alexander Volokh explained: 
But what does it all mean? Environmental-information laws are 
often misunderstood. Because they do not directly regulate 
production, right-to-know laws are generally considered more 
benign than traditional command-and-control regulation. Their 
advocates commonly depict them as ―voluntary,‖ ―market-based‖ 
programs—and many in the policy community, including those who 
are often critical of command-and-control regulation, have accepted 
this characterization. Yet such a description masks several crucial 
elements of right-to-know programs.384 
 
In order to make this approach work, citizens need to be supplied not only 
with information, but also with an understanding of their role in the political 
process.  If, as Jefferson said, the people are the ―depository of the ultimate 
powers of society,‖385 members of the public need to know how the decision-
making process in their society works and how they can exercise their ―ultimate 
powers.‖ 
The first step is then to help people to understand the situation in which 
they find themselves, to know the risks of living where they live, and even the 
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concept of risk.  People need to know what can be done to reduce or eliminate 
those risks and to understand the situations driving the polluters who created the 
risks in the first place.  Beyond that, people need to understand what government 
can and cannot do or will or will not do to deal with risks.  People also need to 
understand and avail themselves of the coping mechanisms put in place to 
manage the risks, and to know what to do if the risks threaten to become—or 
actually become – crises.  More simply put, people must know the key variables 
at work and the choices available.  Only then can people make real choices.  
However, the ―languages‖ of scientists, bureaucrats, and businessmen 
are not the ―language‖ of the majority of the people who live in the communities 
where those risk-bearing facilities are located. 
It is difficult for communities to understand statistical assessments, 
biomedical descriptions, detailed environmental analysis, economic estimations, 
and insurance evaluations, and so forth. The majority of the population in the 
areas of risks, as research has shown,386 is usually composed of lower income 
workers who are too busy finding ways to keep their jobs, feed their families, and 
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give an education to their kids. The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) is said to be 
too complex even for some specialists. When uninformed people see that 
chemical ―x‖ is being released in hundreds of thousands of pounds a year and 
chemical ―z‖ was released in a mere dozen of pounds, they may not be able to 
tell that an ounce of chemical ―z‖ might be thousands of times more toxic than ten 
pounds of chemical ―x.‖ Hence, information alone is just not enough.387 
Volokh listed some of the most common problems found in EPCRA. 
Among them, he mentioned that a) TRI data are self-reported and are not 
checked for accuracy, b) TRI data are highly sensitive to changes in reporting 
guidance estimation methods and changes in production levels, c) EPCRA does 
not apply to facilities with under ten full-time employees, and d) many toxic 
substances are not included in the over 600 TRI reportable chemicals as they are 
not currently used in large enough quantities, which may be an incentive to 
replace listed chemicals with non-listed chemicals.388 
Nonetheless, Volokh contended that, even with its loopholes, EPCRA has 
been successful in its objectives: 
The TRI requires nothing but reporting, but has had a large effect 
nevertheless. Stock analysts, house hunters, and environmentalists 
use its data to evaluate companies and neighborhoods. Journalists 
and policy analysts use TRI data to inform debates on the 
effectiveness of environmental policy or to argue for more stringent 
regulation. State agencies use TRI data to track their own 
environmental progress. Businesses do too—capital markets seem 
to care about this new source of information, and the TRI seems to 
have prompted emissions reductions and increased environmental 
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compliance. Small wonder that environmental officials call TRI one 
of the most successful federal environmental programs.389 
 
The process Volokh described reveals the importance of the involvement 
of communication professionals.390 Specialized science, health, environmental, 
financial, risk, legal, and political communicators, analysts, journalists, and public 
relations practitioners are able to compile and synthesize the information given 
by experts in different areas and transform it into something meaningful and 
relatable to the daily lives of the affected communities.391  
In this case specifically, environmental risk communicators are prepared 
to understand all involved variables and put into a narrative form that makes 
sense to the community members. A risk communicator in a corporation can 
transform hundreds of pages of numbers, economic projections, and cost-benefit 
analysis into a simple ―if we change this, we will have to increase the product‘s 
price by this much,‖ or ―cut this many jobs,‖ etc. An environmental communicator 
in an environmental justice organization can transform a massive amount of 
political, legal, and scientific data into digestible list of risks and choices.  
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More importantly, as Hadden392 explained, environmental risk 
communicators can educate community members to know how to protect 
themselves through environmentally healthy practices, legal actions, and political 
negotiations. Understanding how the ―system‖ works, citizens can make use of a 
number of tools to get their voices heard. 
Research has shown that even in relatively minor tragedies, as Love 
Canal turned out to be, communities that were able to use media and political 
influence obtained social gains and even elimination of the cause of risks. 393  
However, sound scientific research can provide more long-lasting gains at the 
macro level as it builds on the pool of knowledge and provides better arguments 
for better laws and better decisions.394 
As seen on chapter 3, the roles of environmental risk communicators fit 
well with Florio‘s intent for EPCRA. The academic and legal literature analyses of 
right-to-know provisions in general have shown that, based on the use of 
communication tools and techniques to educate the public, such provisions are 
usually cheaper, more efficient, and more democratic than provisions based on 
either on ―command-and-control‖ and ―market-based‖ approaches alone, 
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specially on topics involving a complex set of variables.395 The history of EPCRA 
represented in this dissertation is evidence that a right-to-know provision can be 
a powerful complement to other types of legislation. 
Environmental risk communication, allied to other social, educational, and 
communication processes also helps to improve the organization and 
cohesiveness of social groups and movements.396 That characteristic was seen 
in the history of EPCRA in how the broad Environmental Justice Movement, and 
specially the Anti-toxic/Environmental Health Movement, was able to organize 
and become much more influential in order to obtain the results they desired.   
Lois Gibbs and historians of environmental health and justice mentioned 
that Love Canal was not the first and, by far, not the most tragic environmental 
incident involving toxic contamination, but because of the community 
organization driven by Gibbs, it became a turning-point in the fight against toxic 
contamination that led to the enactment of CERCLA.397 Similarly, McGurty 
demonstrated that the main reason Warren County is considered the birth of 
Environmental Justice Movement was because of the level of organization it 
presented, attracting national attention.398 
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The right-to-know approach of EPCRA opened a number of opportunities 
for communication practice and research that entails more analyses to be 
adequately understood. Consequently, new laws based on the right-to-know 
principle being enacted in more than 80 countries are opening a vast new market 
for communication research, but also for professional journalists, public relations 
practitioners, and communication specialists in health, science, legal, and 
political communications. The global trend identified by Florini and Shrivastava399 
of right-to-know legislation has become a new phenomenon, reflecting Beck‘s400 
predictions, but it all started with one piece of legislation, born from the failure of 
the political process and the claims of citizens in 1986.401 
What does it all mean? 
A few conclusions can be made from the history of EPCRA. First, the right 
to know in EPCRA cannot be traced to one single origin as it was born from the 
cries of thousands of citizens and the Anti-toxic and Environmental Justice 
Movements. However, the theoretical and philosophical construct found in the 
legal and academic literature after EPCRA402 could be verifiably related to the 
ideas of self-governance and the right to know about the purposes of government 
championed by Thomas Jefferson during the times of the American Revolution.  
                                                 
399
 Flo rin i, TheRight to Know; Shrivastava. The Right to Information. 
400
 Beck, Risk Society. 
401
 Karkkainen, “Informat ion as Environmental Regulation .”  
402
 Uhm. “The Founders”; Hadden, A Citizen’s Right to Know; Jacobson, “Safeguarding National Security”; 
Hamilton, Regulation through revelation; Bolstridge, EPCRA Data; Bullard and Johnson, “Environmental 
justice: Grassroots activism.”  
  143 
Second, EPCRA‘s unique characteristics—which go beyond the text of 
the law and allowed for non-governmental organizations, grassroots groups, and 
a few private organizations to bui ld analytical and educational tools to 
complement and maximize the force of the law even against Congress and 
EPA—were not a coincidence or ―fluke‖ of the system. They were, in fact, a 
conscientious effort of the legislators, like James J. Florio and Gerry Sikorski, to 
experiment with the right to know as a new approach to policymaking to correct 
what they saw as fatal flaws in CERCLA. The governmental failure to enforce 
and the private sector refusal to comply showed them that neither ―command-
and-control‖ nor ―market-based‖ approaches were enough to get industry to 
reduce the use of toxic chemicals.  
Florio, who was also the author of CERCLA, specifically mentioned that 
the intent of EPCRA was to give citizens the power to do what government 
couldn‘t. During the hearing of the Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on 
Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism, Florio discussed with Nelson, Ladner, 
Sikorski and Vento what would happen if the community-right-to-know provision 
didn‘t pass. They all agreed that it would leave EPCRA ―toothless.‖403 The 
combination of the right to know with citizens‘ suits provisions in EPCRA put the 
enforcement power in the hands of the people who felt they were being 
victimized either by industry or by governmental agencies.   
Third, although full of loopholes and being targeted by opponents 
throughout the more than 20 years of its existence, EPCRA seems to have 
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achieved its main goals of reactivating and boosting local and state legislations, 
creating a database on the release of toxic materials, reducing the use of toxic 
and hazardous materials in general, and allowing citizens, scientists, and private 
organizations to participate in the decision making on such issues.  
Most of the criticisms directed to EPCRA, strangely enough, were part of 
what EPCRA was supposed to accomplish. As Bolstridge404 pointed out, one of 
the worst criticisms made against EPCRA is that it provides the right to know, but 
not the right to understand. However, both by following Hadden‘s analysis405 and 
by reading Florio‘s intentions for EPCRA,406 that burden to educate was built into 
EPCRA to be part of what citizen organizations would do. These organizations 
were to work with, and demand participation from if necessary, governments and 
private corporations to improve understanding of the topic. Florio and others 
predicted that, once the information was put out there in an organized form, 
scientists, policymakers, and citizens‘ organizations would study the database 
and improve it.407 The newspaper stories from the 1990s and early 2000s proved 
that EPCRA did that. 
Other criticisms were that the list of toxic chemicals to be reported in TRI 
was too small and that it also should include chemicals not only stored and 
released, but also those used in the manufacturing of products. The idea was to 
create a system of checks and balances to keep track of toxic chemicals, to 
measure amounts acquired by a given facility and where those chemicals would 
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go:  into storage, into products, or into release of chemicals into the environment. 
Chapter IV showed that, although very slowly, the EPA was successful in nearly 
doubling the number of chemicals to be included into the Toxic Release 
Inventory. That may still not be enough for people who want to be free of toxic 
chemicals, but it shows a progress that could be repeated. 
What Florio couldn‘t have predicted was that the next step: the expansion 
and improvement of the law in consequence of the needs discovered through the 
information gathered in the Toxic Release Inventory, the Local Emergency 
Planning Committees, and by corporations and citizens organizations. Such 
improvement has not happen in the United States by the end of this study408 
because of the change of political focus in the face the threat of terrorism after 
1999 and, especially, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As Rena 
Steinzor told the Senate‘s Subcommittee on Superfund and Environmental 
Health in 2007, ―More than any other environmental program, Superfund is a 
victim of compassion fatigue and political doublespeak.‖409 
However, EPCRA‘s right-to-know approach became a model for more 
than 80 other countries (as of 2009), which have enacted laws under the same 
principle. Some of them, like REACH in the European Union, have already 
expanded the concept of the right to know in EPCRA to embrace not only the 
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release of toxic materials but also labeling of products that contain any potentially 
hazardous materials. 410 
In the end, EPCRA‘s history showed that, as a piece of legislation, 
EPCRA was a step further than previous legislation aiming to control and reduce 
the release of toxic materials in the environment and communities. However, as 
an approach to policy making, the right to know in EPCRA became even more 
successful. It survived a series of direct attacks thanks to the workings of 
organized citizens who wouldn‘t give up the window opened by EPCRA.  
Limitations of this research 
This research presented the application of a historiographic method that, 
following the discussion raised in chapter 1, sought to carefully and accurately 
represent a history of EPCRA focusing on its right-to-know principle. In order to 
achieve that the researcher identified proper primary sources, crosschecked 
those sources against other primary sources for verification and completeness of 
information. The researcher also sought the guidance of secondary sources and 
experts in communication history, journalism, risk communication, and 
environmental sociology. The main limitation was the lack of funding which 
prevented the researcher from visiting the archives and collections of primary 
documents and to search for unknown sources that are not listed in the literature 
or in other primary sources.  
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However, thanks to the effort of many libraries, archives, collections, and 
other groups in charge of preserving historical documents, the great majority of 
the documents mentioned and cited in this dissertation could be found in digital 
format. Some of them were copied and added to the Appendix to facilitate 
verification by peers. Others are listed with hyperlinks in the Appendix with the 
same purpose. 
The very few documents of which the researcher could only find 
transcriptions but not a digital copy of the original were crosschecked with the 
secondary sources and the credibility of the facility that made such transcription 
available. Only the ones that were cited by at least two independent secondary 
sources and could be found on the website of a reliable database were included 
in the text of the dissertation. With that process, the researcher hopes to have 
reduced such limitation to a minimum. Nonetheless, in the historical process, 
many sources might be unknown or found unexpectedly during interactions with 
people who either participate in an historical event and their families or work as 
custodians of personal collections.  
Besides, the funding limitations, the general limitations of the historical 
process also played a role in this study. There is no way to find out what the 
Founding Fathers or the Framers of the Constitution intended with their writings 
and/or actions. The failure to find in the literature and in the primary sources any 
detailed reference to the right to know in the period between 1822 and 1953 also 
darkens in part the understanding of its evolution.  
  148 
The search for people who were involved in the enactment of EPCRA, like 
James J. Florio, and more primary sources will be the next step in this research 
line. 
Future Research 
This dissertation is only a necessary first step in developing a body of 
research that can truly and accurately represent the impact of the right-to-know 
approach to public policy and its meaning for the study of communication. As 
seen in chapters 4 and 5, EPCRA opened a series of opportunities for 
communicators to inform and educate the public (broadly defined to include 
government officials, industry executives, scientists, and citizens in general) 
about how to best participate in the public arena and achieve better decisions. 
The history of EPCRA allows researchers in the fields of communication, 
history, sociology, law, political sciences, social service, toxicology, waste 
management, environmental studies, and any other field related to emergency 
preparedness and public policy issues to understand how information can be 
used to improve the social-political process involving the release of toxic and 
hazardous materials. It also serves as stepping stone for extrapolation and 
exploration of how right-to-know provisions can affect other areas. 
The next step for the researcher will be to look into the discourse and 
practice of communicators, politicians, government officials, scientists, 
community organizers, lawyers, and other people directly involved in the process 
of expanding the scope of EPCRA, from a source of information, to a system of 
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education about public participation, health, safety, environmental justice, 
government, and so forth, like the authors of EPCRA intended. Following 
Professor Baram‘s question whether informed citizens could take a responsible 
role in making public policy following the Jeffersonian ideal,411 EPCRA‘s history 
seems to indicate that citizens can, at least in part.  Perhaps reliance on the 
people is too often politicians‘ empty rhetoric, and perhaps reliance on the people 
is pointless.  Such a cynical conclusion, however, flies in the face of the 
republican foundations and democratic strivings of the experiment known as the 
United States of America.  More detailed research on  efforts to use EPCRA, 
chronicling and analyzing  successes and failures,  can give a better picture of 
using the right to know principle to empower communities to protect and to 
improve themselves.     
Concluding remarks 
With all justified and unjustified criticisms, EPCRA‘s right-to-know 
provisions have been proven to be able to provide openness in government even 
when government itself was fighting for secrecy. It was an approach created to 
circumvent the actions of Gorsuch‘s EPA and ended up circumventing a 
congressional attempt to shut it down in 1994/1995, an industry lawsuit from 
1994 to 1997, a gag order against EPA in 1999, and anti-openness laws—USA 
Patriot Act in October 2001 and the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 
(CIIA)—after the attacks of September 11, 2001. 
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Furthermore, EPCRA, in some cases more successfully than others, 
brought governments, companies, and citizens to sit together to discuss common 
goals on the use of toxic and hazardous materials in American society.  Thanks to 
it, environmental and civil rights organizations used EPCRA as a starting point to 
educate and to organize communities. Governmental agencies were able to 
share the burden of control and enforcement with the civil society. Ethically 
driven corporations improved their rapport and relations with local communities. 
The news media used EPCRA to fulfill their historic roles of watchdogs of 
government.  
As corporations increased in power during the 20th century, often having 
more effects on peoples' lives than government, they were insulated from the 
watchdog function.  Before EPCRA, openness legislation, including the federal 
Freedom of Information Act, applied only to government executive-branch 
agencies, excluding legislatures, leaving corporations shrouded in secrecy.  
EPCRA removed, at least in part, that shroud. 
As Gibbs wrote, this discussion changed the focus from how much toxic 
contamination society could bear to how much toxic contamination can be 
avoided altogether.412 EPCRA became focus of both supporting campaigns and 
attacks in local, state, and federal levels, but put the discussion of toxic pollution 
in the mainstream of national topics. It may still need revisions and amendments, 
but the literature on EPCRA reaches a rare consensus: it was the first step for a 
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different kind of policymaking. Even President Bill Clinton attested to the 
resilience of the right to know against the deeds of Congress: 
The message here is clear. The Congress can go right along with 
its plan to undermine America‘s anti-pollution laws, but it will go 
nowhere fast. Community right-to-know is here to stay. 
Bill Clinton413   
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Excerpt (footnote 62) 
Common Sense by Thomas Paine 
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To CONCLUDE, however strange it may appear to some, or 
however unwilling they may be to think so, matters not, but many 
strong and striking reasons may be given to show that nothing can 
settle our affairs so expeditiously as an open and determined 
declaration for independence. Some of which are, 
 
First. — It is the custom of Nations, when any two are at war, for 
some other powers, not engaged in the quarrel, to step in as 
mediators, and bring about the preliminaries of a peace; But while 
America calls herself the subject of Great Britain, no power, 
however well disposed she may be, can offer her mediation. 
Wherefore, in our present state we may quarrel on for ever. 
 
Secondly. — It is unreasonable to suppose that France or Spain 
will give us any kind of assistance, if we mean only to make use of 
that assistance for the purpose of repairing the breach, and 
strengthening the connection between Britain and America; 
because, those powers would be sufferers by the consequences. 
 
Thirdly. — While we profess ourselves the subjects of Britain, we 
must, in the eyes of foreign nations, be considered as Rebels. The 
precedent is somewhat dangerous to their peace, for men to be in 
arms under the name of subjects; we, on the spot, can solve the 
paradox; but to unite resistance and subjection requires an idea 
much too refined for common understanding. 
 
Fourthly. — Were a manifesto to be published, and despatched to 
foreign Courts, setting forth the miseries we have endured, and the 
peaceful methods which we have ineffectually used for redress; 
declaring at the same time that not being able longer to live happily 
or safely under the cruel disposition of the British Court, we had 
been driven to the necessity of breaking off all connections with 
her; at the same time, assuring all such Courts of our peaceable 
disposition towards them, and of our desire of entering into trade 
with them; such a memorial would produce more good effects to 
this Continent than if a ship were freighted with petitions to Britain.  
 
Under our present denomination of British subjects, we can neither 
be received nor heard abroad; the custom of all Courts is against 
us, and will be so, until by an independence we take rank with other 
nations. 
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LIBERTY OF THE PRESS.1 
The writer of this remembers a remark made to him by Mr. 
Jefferson concerning the English newspapers, which at that time, 
1787, while Mr. Jefferson was Minister at Paris, were most vulgarly 
abusive. The remark applies with equal force to the Federal papers 
of America. The remark was, that ―the licentiousness of the press 
produces the same effect as the restraint of the press was intended 
to do, i f the restraint was to prevent things being told, and the 
licentiousness of the press prevents things being believed when 
they are told.‖ We have in this state an evidence of the truth of this 
remark. The number of Federal papers in the city and state of New-
York are more than five to one to the number of Republican papers, 
yet the majority of the elections go always against the Federal 
papers; which is demonstrative evidence that the licentiousness of 
those papers is destitute of credit. 
Whoever has made observation on the characters of nations will 
find it generally true that the manners of a nation, or of a party, can 
be better ascertained from the character of its press than from any 
other public circumstance. If its press is licentious, its manners are 
not good. Nobody believes a common liar, or a common defamer. 
Nothing is more common with printers, especially of newspapers, 
than the continual cry of the Liberty of the Press, as if because they 
are printers they are to have more privileges than other people. As 
the term Liberty of the Press is adopted in this country without 
being understood, I will state the origin of it, and show what it 
means. The term comes from England, and the case was as 
follows: 
Prior to what is in England called the Revolution, which was in 
1688, no work could be published in that country without first 
obtaining the permission of an officer appointed by the government 
for inspecting works intended for publication. The same was the 
case in France, except that in France there were forty who were 
called Censors, and in England there was but one, called 
Imprimateur. 
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At the Revolution, the office of Imprimateur was abolished, and as 
works could then be published without first obtaining the permission 
of the government officer, the press was, in consequence of that 
abolition, said to be free, and it was from this circumstance that the 
term Liberty of the Press arose. The press, which is a tongue to the 
eye, was then put exactly in the case of the human tongue. A man 
does not ask liberty before hand to say something he has a mind to 
say, but he becomes answerable afterwards for the atrocities he 
may utter. In like manner, if a man makes the press utter atrocious 
things, he becomes as answerable for them as if he had uttered 
them by word of mouth. Mr. Jefferson has said in his inaugural 
speech, that “error of opinion might be tolerated, when reason was 
left free to combat it.” This is sound philosophy in cases of error. 
But there is a difference between error and licentiousness. 
Some lawyers in defending their clients, (for the generality of 
lawyers, like Swiss soldiers, will fight on either side,) have often 
given their opinion of what they defined the liberty of the press to 
be. One said it was this, another said it was that, and so on, 
according to the case they were pleading. Now these men ought to 
have known that the term liberty of the press arose from a fact, the 
abolition of the office of Imprimateur, and that opinion has nothing 
to do in the case. The term refers to the fact of printing free from 
prior restraint, and not at all to the matter printed, whether good or 
bad. The public at large,—or in case of prosecution, a jury of the 
country—will be judges of the matter. 
Thomas Paine. 
October 19, 1806. 
[1]From the American Citizen, October 20, 1806. Paine had 
witnessed in France (see vol. iii. p. 138) the terrible effects of 
personal libels shielded under the liberty of press.—Editor. 
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 LEXIS NEXIS results were too extensive to be inserted here. The 
articles were saved to an electronic file that can be consulted by 
contacting the researcher. A description of the search can be found 
in chapter 1. 
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